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PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL POWER AND DISCRETION IN
FEDERAL PENDENT JURISDICTION CASES
The closely-related doctrines of pendent and anci/lagy jurisdiction allow federal
courts to hear matters over which they ordinarly would not have subject-matter
jurisdiction. When these doctrines apply and whether jurisdiction should be assumed, however, is not altogetherclear. This Note examinespendent and ancillag
junsdiction in connection with the role offjudicial discretion, and suggests guidehnes to aid in the analysis ofjurisdictionproblems.
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INTRODUCTION

Under certain circumstances, federal courts may hear claims over
which neither the Constitution nor Congress has granted them jurisdiction.1 The doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction confer power 2
on the federal courts to adjudicate those claims that are sufficiently related to controversies arising under either federal question 3 or diversity
jurisdiction.4
The related doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed
separately, and until relatively recently were considered to be independent theories.5 Ancillary jurisdiction, as it typically has been applied, refers to the federal court's power to hear collateral claims that arise from
the same transaction or occurrence as that upon which a significant federal claim is based.6 Pendent jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to
the power of the federal courts to consider a state claim along with a
substantial federal claim if both arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact." 7 These definitions are still followed in most situations.8 Recently, however, it has become more difficult to draw significant
distinctions between the two doctrines.9 Since the development of the
history of pendent party jurisdiction,10 which in some situations gives the
federal courts jurisdiction over pendent claims asserted against parties
over whom no independent jurisdiction exists, perhaps no important differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction remain.tI
Although federal courts have constitutional power over pendent and
1. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3567 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
2. Article III of the Constitution provides the federal courts with jurisdiction over
cases based on federal questions and those based on diversity of citizenship of the parties.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3. Federal question cases are those arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or those involving admiralty claims. Id.
4. Article III provides for federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship of the
parties as well as on federal questions. See id.
5. See Minahan, Pendent and Anci/larv Jurisdiction of the United States Federal District
Courts, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 279, 280-81 (1976).
6. See general'y 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3523.
7. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
8. See notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
9. See Note, Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. GibbsFederal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 207-08 (1976).
10. See notes 64-76 inra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of pendent
party jurisdiction, see Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753 (1978); Fortune,
PendentJursdt'ction-TheProblem ofPendenting Parties, 34 U. PrTr. L. Rstv. 1 (1972); Garvey,
The Limits ofAncillayJun'diction, 57 TEx. L. REv. 697 (1979); Minahan, supra note 5.
11. See Minahan, supra note 5, at 280; Comment, Pendent and Ancllai, Jurisdiction: Towards a Synethesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263, 1265-71 (1975); Note, The
Concept oLaw-TiedPendentJurisdiction Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627,
643 (1978).
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ancillary claims, the exercise of that power is typically discretionary.12
In most cases, the courts have exercised their discretion liberally in favor
of hearing these claims.13 The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a reluctance to extend federal jurisdiction beyond certain limits, 14

however. Where these limits have been drawn is not entirely clear, but
as a result of the recent trend toward the narrowing of federal jurisdiction, the lower federal courts' exercise of discretion with respect to pendent and ancillary claims may be similarly limited.15 This Note will
examine the changes in the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that have taken place in recent years, and the effect of those changes
on the federal courts' discretionary exercise of their jurisdictional power.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

PendentJursdiction

Pendent jurisdiction initially allowed federal courts to adjudicate a
plaintiff's state law claims that were incidental to claims arising under
federal law.16 The principles underlying the doctrine first appeared in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,17 in which the presence of a question of
state law was found insufficient to defeat federal jurisdiction.18 Chief
Justice Marshall held that a federal court has the power to adjudicate
12. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Minahan, supra note 5,
at 311.
13. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3567, at 455-56.
14. See, e.g., Owen Equip. and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. See general'y notes 131-383 i'nfra and accompanying text.
16. See Minahan, supra note 5, at 293.
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (3d ed. 1976); Note, supra note 11, at 629 n. 15.
In Osborn, an act of Congress chartering the Bank of the United States provided that
the Bank could "sue and be sued ... in any Circuit Court of the United States." When
the state of Ohio attempted to collect a tax that the Bank contended was unconstitutional,
the Bank sought an injunction to prevent the collection of the tax. Chief Justice Marshall
held that Congress' authorization of the Bank to "sue and be sued" granted the federal
courts jurisdiction over all cases to which the Bank was a party. Because the Bank was
itself a creation of federal law, questions regarding its powers to do business ultimately
would also be based on federal law. Thus federal question jurisdiction would exist over
any state law question that arose in connection with suits to which the Bank was party.
The Chief Justice stated:
[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. That the Constitution gives the federal courts jurisdiction over
"cases" rather than over "questions" tends to support the proposition that the federal
district courts cannot function properly without the power to decide all issues that arise in
cases before them. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; C. WRIGHT, supra, § 19.
18. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823.
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both state and federal claims in cases in which the court's jurisdiction is
predicated on the plaintiff's claim of a right arising under federal law, if
the state claim is incidental to or necessary for a determination of the
federal claim. 19

A further development of the theory of pendent jurisdiction took place
in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad.20 In Siler, the Supreme Court
allowed federal jurisdiction over state claims that were asserted in a case
in which jurisdiction was based on a federal question, 2 1 but unlike Osborn, Si'ler provided that the state claim over which the court may take
22
jurisdiction need not be necessary to a resolution of the federal claim.
More important, Si/er permitted the federal courts to decide a case entirely on state law grounds, without being required to adjudicate any of
23
the federal claims asserted.
In Hum v. Oursler,24 the Supreme Court extended pendent jurisdiction
19. Id. at 820-21. Osborn seems to support a theory of broad federal jurisdiction in
that it appears to hold that an entity whose existence depends upon federal law may
automatically sue or be sued in the federal courts. See id. at 823. Other language in
Osborn, however, may indicate that the standard the Court used was based on the "source
of law" theory, that a case arises under federal law if federal law creates the right sought to
be enforced. See id. The Court stated that "the judicial power of the Union extends effectively and beneficially to that most important class of cases, which depend on the character of the cause." Id. at 822. See Note, supra note 11, at 638 n.70.
20. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). A railroad company brought suit to enjoin the enforcement
of an order of the state railroad commission setting maximum freight rates. The railroad
contended that the order was invalid both because it was unauthorized by state statute
and because it was in violation of the federal constitution. Id. at 177, 190-91. The statute
was alleged to violate Article IV, section 4, by vesting "legislative, executive and judicial
powers of an absolute and arbitrary nature over railroad carriers in one body or tribunal,
styled the railroad commission," id. at 190-91, and the fourteenth amendment, in that the
rates were alleged to have been so low as to be confiscatory. Id. at 191.
21. The state railroad commission argued that because no valid federal question was
present the district court had no jurisdiction over the matter. Because the railroad's position was that the state commission had no power to fix the rates, the state contended that
no state action was involved and that therefore the suit did not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. See id. at 192-93.
22. Id. at 190-91;see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820
(1824). Because some of the federal questions raised were more than "merely colorable,
and [were not] fraudulently raised for the purpose of attempting to give jurisdiction to a
Federal court," they were sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 213 U.S. at 192.
23. The Court stated:
The Federal questions . . . gave the Circuit Court jurisdiction, and, having
properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all the questions in the
case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising
them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or
state questions only.
213 U.S. at 191. The Court went on to consider only the state law question, preferring to
resolve the case on state law grounds rather than consider federal constitutional questions
unnecessarily. Id. at 193; see Note, supra note 11, at 629 n.15.
24. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from producing or
performing a play, alleging both the infringement of plaintiffs' copyright and a state law
claim of unfair competition. Id. at 239. The Court held that although the unfair competi-
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to include state law issues that arose in conjunction with federal claims as
long as the pendent claims were based on the same cause of action as a
significant federal claim.25 A difficulty with the Hum standard, however,
was that the meaning of "cause of action," which the Court did not define specifically, was subject to inconsistent interpretations.26 Nevertheless, until the 1966 case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,27 the Hum test
remained the basis for determining under what circumstances the federal
courts could decide pendent state claims.28
B.

Ancillay Jurisdiction

Principles of ancillary jurisdiction similarly enable federal courts to
assert jurisdiction over an entire case, and thus to decide collateral issues
over which no independent jurisdiction exists.2 9 Initially, ancillary jurisdiction referred to the courts' power to adjudicate claims of nonparties to
property controlled by the court. 30 One of the first significant ancillary
jurisdiction cases, Freeman v. Howe, 3 t illustrated the necessity for a rule
tion claim was without merit, the federal court nevertheless had jurisdiction over it as part
of the same cause of action out of which the federal copyright infringement claim arose.
Id. at 240. Pendent jurisdiction over state claims brought in conjunction with federal
copyright claims later was granted legislatively by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976), which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting
a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws."
25. 289 U.S. at 245-46. The Court held that
the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a
separate and distinct non-federal cause of action because it is joined in the same
complaint with a federal cause of action. The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even
though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon
the federal cause of action.
Id. (emphasis in original).
26. The Court's only reference to what might constitute a "cause of action" is its
statement that "[t]he bill alleges the violation of a single right, namely, the right to protection of the copyrighted play. And it is this violation which constitutes the cause of action." Id. at 246. Because of the Hum test's indefiniteness, no clear standard for defining a
"cause of action" was ever developed by the lower federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, supra
note 17, § 19.
27. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See notes 46-55 infra and accompanying text.
28. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 19.
29. See Minahan, supra note 5, at 297-302.
30. See id. at 281-82.
31. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861). In Freeman, a diversity case, a United States marshal seized some railroad cars under a writ of attachment. The mortgagees of the railroad
successfully brought an action in state court to recover the cars. The Supreme Court on
appeal held that the state court had no power to interfere with property controlled by the
federal court, but that the mortgagees' claims were ancillary to the original federal action.
See id. at 459-60.
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allowing jurisdiction over such matters.3 2 In Freeman, the Supreme Court
held that a party whose interests are affected when a federal court takes
control over certain property may assert a claim to the property despite
the lack of independent jurisdiction over that party. 33 Later cases extended ancillary jurisdiction to include nonfederal matters that arose in
34
suits to enforce judgments and orders.
In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,35 the Court broadened the ancillary jurisdiction theory to include counterclaims that involved neither
diverse parties nor federal questions. Significantly, the Court held that
the state law claim need not be exactly the same as the underlying federal claim;36 it only need arise from the same "transaction or occurrence"
as the federal anchor claim.37 Ancillary jurisdiction was later expanded
even further to balance the liberal joinder provisions of the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure38 with federal jurisdictional requirements.39 As
32. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 9.
33. 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 459-60.
34. See, e.g., Cincinnati, I. & W.R.R. v. Indianapolis Union Ry., 270 U.S. 107 (1926);
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S.
401 (1893).
35. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). The plaintiff contended that the defendant had violated the
Sherman Act by failing to provide stock-ticker service. The defendant counterclaimed,
alleging that the plaintiff was stealing the quotations of the defendant. Id. at 603. The
Supreme Court held that ancillary jurisdiction over the counterclaim was proper, although the parties were nondiverse and no federal question was raised by the counterclaim. See id. at 609.
36. See id. at 610. The Court commented:
Essential facts alleged by appellant enter into and constitute in part the cause of
action set forth in the counterclaim. That they are not precisely identical, or
that the counterclaim embraces additional allegations, as, for example, that appellant is unlawfully getting the quotations, does not matter. To hold otherwise
would be to rob this branch of the rule of all serviceable meaning, since the facts
relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever, are, in all particulars, the same as
those constituting the defendant's counterclaim.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. The Court based its holding on the wording of Equity Rule 30, which states in
part: "The answer must state in short and simple form any counter-claim arising out of
the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit." The Court stated that this part of
the rule was sufficient to permit the counterclaim without proof of an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction. For a discussion of Equity Rule 30 and the application of ancillary jurisdiction to compulsory counterclaims, see 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
9113.13 (2d ed. 1948). The Court further held:
"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of
many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship. The refusal to furnish the quotations
is one of the links in the chain which constitutes the transaction upon which
appellant here bases its cause of action. It is an important part of the transaction
constituting the subject-matter of the counterclaim. It is the one circumstance
without which neither party would have found it necessary to seek relief.
270 U.S. at 610.
38. The Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
pursuant to the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 9, at 23; see Minahan, supra note 5, at 297-302. See
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a result of this expansion, ancillary jurisdiction now exists with respect to
cross-claims,4 0 compulsory counterclaims,41 interpleader,42 impleader,43
and intervention as of right. 44 Ancillary jurisdiction thus evolved into a
theory broader in its application than pendent jurisdiction, which,
strictly defined, applies only to the joinder of state and federal claims.45
C

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs and the Merger of Pendent
and Ancillay Jurisdiction

The approach to pendent jurisdiction was broadened also, as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 46 The
Court held in that case that pendent jurisdiction was no longer limited to
those state law claims that arose from the same cause of action as claims
based on federal law. 4 7 The federal courts were held to have the power
to adjudicate state and federal claims that derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact"48 in such a manner that a plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."49 The
Court justified the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in such situations on
the grounds of "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants."50
While apparently expanding the scope of possible pendent claims,
generally Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on Federaljursdiction,28 STAN. L. REV.
395 (1976).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g); see, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per
Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir.
1966); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1956); Garvey, supra
note 10, at 713.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); see 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1,§ 1414 & n.55.
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 22; see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523
(1967).
43, FED. R. Civ. P. 14; see, e.g., Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); Garvey,
supra note 10, at 702-03.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a); see Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co.,
420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970).
45. See Minahan, supra note 5, at 292-97.
46. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). A coal mining company closed a mine and laid off a number
of union members. A short time later, a subsidiary of the company hired Gibbs as mine
superintendent for a nearby mine it was planning to open. Gibbs also was given the contract to haul the coal. Union members forcibly prevented the mine from opening as
scheduled; the UMW representative then caused a picket line to be established to prevent
further violence. As a result, the mine did not open and Gibbs lost both his job as superintendent and the contract to haul the coal. He brought this action against the UMW,
alleging a secondary boycott in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act and a
state law claim of interference with contractual relations. Id. at 718-20.
47. See id. at 724-25. The Court noted that the Hum rule limiting the application of
pendent jurisdiction to claims arising from the same "cause of action" was "unnecessarily
grudging." Id.
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 726.
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however, the Court also may have broadened the -discretion of the federal
courts to decline to hear those claims.51 If the considerations of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"52 that the Court listed in
Gibbs are not sufficiently strong in a particular case, the federal court
may decline to hear the pendent claim to avoid unnecessary decisions of
state law.53 Gibbs thus sets forth a two-part test for federal jurisdiction
over pendent claims: the federal courts have power over such claims if
both the state and federal claims are based on common "operative
facts," 54 and the courts have the discretion to exercise that power as long
as doing so can be justified by the considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness, balanced by the need to avoid unnecessary
decisions of state law.55
By rejecting the Hum test, according to which pendent jurisdiction
could be asserted over only those state claims grounded on the same
cause of action as a federal claim,56 the Court in Gibbs narrowed the gap

between the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction;5 7 the "same
transaction or occurrence" test for ancillary jurisdiction set forth in Moore
v. New York Cotton Exchange is substantially the same in principle as the
Gibbs "common nucleus of operative fact" test for pendent jurisdiction.58
The two doctrines still differ, however, in the sense that discretion, the
second half of the Gibbs test, plays a less important role with respect to
ancillary jurisdiction. From the time of the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts have systematically expanded ancillary jurisdiction to include almost all related multiple-party
51. The Court stated that pendent jurisdiction is a "doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right." Id.; see Minahan, supra note 5, at 303.
52. 383 U.S. at 726.
53. The Court stated that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided as a
matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a
surer-footed reading of applicable law." Id. (footnote omitted). This principle also underlies the abstention doctrines, which are used under various circumstances to avoid federal
constitutional decisions if the case may be resolved on the basis of state law, see, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); to avoid unnecessary conflict with a
state's administration of its affairs, see, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); or to
avoid resolution by a federal court of unsettled questions of state law, see, e.g., Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360
U.S. 185 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
But see Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Abstention also has been
used as a ground for a federal court's declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction. See Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Adams, 482 F. Supp. 170, 180-82 (D. Minn.
1979); notes 152-84 infia and accompanying text.
54. 383 U.S. at 725; see Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent Party
Jurisdiction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1977).
55. 383 U.S. at 726; see Comment, supra note 54, at 1360.
56. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1366.
58. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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claims,5 9 and therefore ancillary jurisdiction typically is applied in a

mechanical fashion under the Rules, 60 with little consideration given to
61
the matter of judicial discretion.
Nevertheless, despite the different approaches to the element of discretion, the effect of Gibbs may have been the elimination of the major differences between the two doctrines, at least with respect to constitutional
power. 62 As a probable result of this apparent merger, many of the lower
federal courts, using the broad scope of ancillary jurisdiction as a justification, have extended pendent jurisdiction to cases in which a nonfederal
claim is asserted against a party over whom the court has no independent
63
jurisdiction.
III.

PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION

A.

The Origins of the Doctrine

The new theory of pendent party jurisdiction permitted the joining of
nondiverse parties on nonfederal claims.6 4 This theory apparently developed from the following language in Gibbs:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever

there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.

.

.

,"

U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and their relationship be-

tween that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the
entire 65action before the court comprises but one constitutional
",case.",
If an action against a nondiverse party was part of the same constitutional case, then, according to this language, pendent jurisdiction would
include that party. In addition, if pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
may be assumed to be essentially the same, 66 then it would follow that if
the latter theory permits federal jurisdiction over additional parties, pendent jurisdiction similarly would permit the joinder of such parties.
A number of federal courts in cases after Gibbs have reached this conclusion. 67 The considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fair59.
60.
61.
62.

See Minahan, supra note 5, at 299-302.
See id. at 302.
See id. at 313-16.
See id. at 280; Comment, Limiting FederalAncillaq and PendentJurisdictionin Diversity

Cases, 64 IOWA L. REV. 930, 941-42 (1979).
63. See cases cited note 85 infra; Currie, supra note 10, at 754.
64. C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 19; see, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1971).
65. 383 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
66. See Comment, supra note 11, at 1281.
67. See, e.g., Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405
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ness raised in Gibbs were the primary bases for the first pendent party
jurisdiction cases. 68 In these cases, the assumption apparently was made
that under Gibbs the federal courts had constitutional power 6 9 over pendent parties. Only the Ninth Circuit consistently has refused to acknowledge the validity of the pendent party doctrine, 70 stating categorically
that "[j]oinder of claims, not joinder of parties, is the object of the
doctrine."71

The Supreme Court did not initially address the question of the fed72
eral court's power over pendent parties. In Moor v. County of,4lameda,
the Court applied the second half of the Gibbs two-part power/discretion
test, finding that the district court, in its discretion, could have declined
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over an additional claim against a
nonfederal party. 73 The Court apparently assumed the existence of constitutional power over such claims; the language of the opinion seemed to
support the general proposition that Gibbs could be extended to pendent
parties.74 Specifically, the Court commented that "numerous decisions
throughout the courts of appeals since Gibbs have recognized the existence of judicial power to hear pendent claims involving pendent parties
where 'the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
"case" 'as defined in Gibbs." 75 The court stated further that "the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims against parties as to whom there
exists no independent basis for federal jurisdiction finds substantial analogues in the joinder of new parties under the well-established doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction."76 Thus it seemed likely that the Court eventually
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968); Princess Cruises Corp., Inc. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F.
Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Comment, supra note 54, at 1360 n.22.
68. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1360-62.
69. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971).
The court stated:
[W]ith the decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs . .. the Court abandoned
such an "unnecessarily grudging" approach [as the Hum test] to the question of
power to hear the pendent claim, and turned instead to a mode of analysis which
focuses upon the relationship between the facts underlying the state and federal
claims.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. diminsed, 435
U.S. 982 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aj'd, 427 U.S. 1
(1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aj'd in part sub nom. Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969);
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
71. Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969).
72. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). This was a civil rights case, brought under sections 1983 and
1988 of title 42, in which the plaintiff sued several law enforcement officers. The plaintiff
asserted an additional pendent claim based on vicarious liability against the county since
governmental immunity had been abrogated by state statute.
73. Id. at 710-17.
74. Id. at 713-14.
75, Id. at 713.
76. Id. at 714.
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would approve the exercise of jurisdiction over pendent parties.
B.

Aldinger v. Howard: A More Restrictive Approach

In Aldinger v. Howard,7 7 the Court, while acknowledging that the federal courts had constitutional power over pendent parties, 78 placed some
restrictions on pendent party cases. 79 The plaintiff, a county employee,
had been discharged from her job because she was living with her boyfriend.80 She brought a federal civil rights action against her employer,
the country treasurer, under section 1983 and a state law claim against
82
the county. 8 ' The district court dismissed the suit against the county
because there were no independent grounds for federal jurisdiction over
the county,8 3 since at that time a county was not considered a "person"
under section 1983.84 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed this
holding.
Despite a number of earlier lower court decisions8 5 and the Supreme
Court's own dictum in Moor, which stated that Gibbs formed the theoretical basis for pendent party jurisdiction,8 6 the court in A/dinger stated that
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, not Gibbs, was the "decisional
bridge"87 between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Thus the Court,
77. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. See id. at 14.
79. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1362; notes 89-90 n/hza and accompanying text.
80. 427 U.S. at 3.
81. See id. at 3-5. Her federal claim was also grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
82. See 427 U.S. at 5.
83. Id. At the time of this decision, governmental subdivisions were not considered to
be suable as "persons" under section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In
1978, however, the Supreme Court concluded that Monroe had been decided incorrectly;
the legislative history of section 1983 was found to contain no intent to confer immunity
on municipalities. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Therefore
the narrow holding of,4ldinger, that a state law claim against a municipality may not be
made pendent to a section 1983 action, is no longer valid.
84. 427 U.S. at 5.
85. See, e.g., Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtis v.
Everetee, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Schulman v. Huck
Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1971); Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); Stone v. Stone,
405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Wilson v. American Chain &
Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
86. See 411 U.S. at 713-14.
87. 427 U.S. at 12. The plaintiff asserted that because the Gibbs "common nucleus of
operative fact" test and the Moore "same transaction" test were so closely related, the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction were essentially the same, id., but the Court
declined to decide whether there were any " 'principled' differences between pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction; or if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences." Id. at 13.
Ancillary jurisdiction originally was premised on the idea that a nonfederal part, in the
interest of fairness, should not be allowed to come into federal court to assert any claim he

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

while acknowledging pendent party jurisdiction to be a possible hybrid
of the two theories, was able to distinguish Gibbs and at the same time
diminish its significance as a justification for the use of pendent party
jurisdiction. The Court held that the test for pendent party jurisdiction
involves not only a determination that the federal court has constitutional power over the claim,8 8 but "that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated"89 federal
jurisdiction. In Aldinger, the Court found that Congress had impliedly
negated federal jurisdiction over the county by its failure to include
counties as "persons" in section 1983.90 In other words, Aldinger meant
that under no circumstances could a county be a pendent party in a
section 1983 action,91 regardless of the presence of the Gibbs discretionary
factors of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." The
element of discretion is therefore eliminated if a court finds that Congress
92
has not intended to confer jurisdiction over the pendent party.
The Aldizger test for pendent party jurisdiction seems on its face to be
one involving power only: the power of federal courts to adjudicate the
pendent claim exists if granted by Article III and if not expressly or impliedly negated by Congress.93 Gibbs having been distinguished and determined to be inapposite,94 the Court did not address the matter of
discretion at all. The Court declined to rule on the general validity of
96
pendent party jurisdiction,95 limiting Aldi7ger to section 1983 cases;
therefore, the extent to which discretion may be an element of the penmight have to property in the custody of the court. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text. By combining this notion, that ancillary jurisdiction extends to nonfederal parties, with the Gibbs holding that pendent jurisdiction applies to any claims arising from a
common nucleus of operative fact, one might logically assume that federal jurisdiction
should be asserted over nonfederal parties against whom a claim is brought that originates
from the same operative facts as a federal claim. The Aldinger Court, however, by concluding that Moore, which involved a counterclaim by a party already properly in federal
court, was the link between the two doctrines, appeared to discount the close relationship
between ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction. See Comment, supra note 54, at 136667.
88. 427 U.S. at 18. Although it distinguished Gibbs, the Court apparently continued
to approve the Gibbs test for constiiuiional power. See id. at 9.
89. Id. at 18.
90. See note 83 supra.
91. Comment, supra note 54, at 1362.
92. Id. The Aldnger test for jurisdictional power involves not only constitutional
power, as in Gibbs, but congressional approval. Without both, jurisdictional power over
pendent parties is not present. Discretion cannot come into play until both of the power
requirements are satisfied. Under Aldinger, a federal court would never be able to hear on
a discretionary basis state law claims asserted against a municipality in conjunction with a
section 1983 suit because no power to do so was conferred by Congress. But see note 83
supra.

93.
94.
95.
96.

427 U.S. at 18; note 87 supra.
See 427 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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dent party situation is not entirely clear. If, as the Court appeared to
suggest in Aldinger, Gibbs does not provide the real theoretical basis for
pendent party jurisdiction, 9 7 the justification for allowing the federal
courts to exercise discretion over pendent parties, assuming the presence
of both constitutional and statutory power, is no longer apparent.9 8
Nevertheless, the Court's comment regarding the circumstances under
which pendent party jurisdiction might be appropriate seemed to allow
some room for discretion. The Court noted:
When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under
28 U.S.C. § 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience
can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal
court may all of the claims be tried together. 99
Rather than eliminating discretion, the Court seems to have added at
least one more discretionary factor, that of the availability of an alternative forum, to the original Gibbs considerations. In his dissent in Aldinger,
Justice Brennan argued that Gibbs was the proper basis for pendent party
jurisdiction and assumed that the matter of discretion was a logical part
of the analysis:
To recognize that the addition of parties under the pendent jurisdiction of the federal courts will sometimes alter the balance of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness," or sometimes threaten to embroil
federal courts in the resolution of uncertain questions of state law, and
thereby make the exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction inappropriate, is only to speak to the question of the proper exercise of judicial
discretion in the circumstances and does not vitiate the Gibbs analysis
or its application to the question of pendent-party jurisdiction. 100
It is apparent, nevertheless, that Aldinger has impliedly limited the ex97. See id. at 12-13.
98. It has been suggested that Gibbs was, in fact, incorrect, and that the Gibbs "facttied" jurisdictional test, based as it is on whether the claims alleged arose from common
operative facts and whether the facts of the case are such as to give rise to the discretionary
considerations of fairness, convenience, and judicial economy, allows the federal courts to
decide claims over which no constitutional power was ever intended. See Note, supra note
11, at 641-48. Aldinger, on the other hand, may have given rise to a theory of "law-tied"
pendent jurisdiction, based on the notion that Article III confers on the federal courts only
limited jurisdiction, and that, additionally, the courts must examine the extent to which
Congress has conferred jurisdiction in each case. See id. at 646. If, as has been suggested,
Gibbs created an unconstitutionally broad test for power over pendent claims, the question
arises whether the more restrictive requirements of Aldinger also restrict the courts' exercise
of discretion. Gibbs itself may have a statutory basis even under the law-tied pendent
jurisdiction theory. Another commentator has said that even though Gibbs did not specifically discuss the statutory basis for pendent jurisdiction, Congress impliedly approved it
by means of 28 U.S.C. § 1131. That statute, which provides for federal jurisdiction over
civil actions arising under the laws of the United States, would presumably include state
law claims closely related to federal claims. See Currie, supra note 10, at 754.
99. 427 U.S. at 18 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 20-21.
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ercise of discretion to the extent that it increases the burden of proving
jurisdictional power.
C

Pendent Parties in Diversity Cases. Owen Equipment
and Erection Co. v. Kroger

In Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, O the Court further attempted to define the limits of the power of the federal courts over pendent parties. In this case, based on diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff, a
citizen of Iowa, brought a wrongful death action against the defendant, a
citizen of Nebraska.10 2 The defendant then impleaded a nondiverse
third party.10 3 The plaintiff amended her complaint to name the third
party, whom she did not know at the time to be nondiverse,104 as an
additional defendant.10 5 The district court thereafter granted the original defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the third party became the sole defendant.1o 6 The district court denied the new
defendant's motion to dismiss,1O7 and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that under Gibbs, the court had the
power to adjudicate the claim because it arose from the same operative
facts as the claim against the original defendant.108
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
stating that the court had misunderstood Gibbs. 109 Gibbs "delineated the
constitutional limits of federal jurisdictional power,", o the Court said,
but, citing both Aldinger and Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo., Il went on to
101. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
102. Id. at 367.
103. Id. at 367-68.
104. Id. at 368-69.
105. Id. at 368.
106. Id. at 368 & n.3.
107. Id. at 369.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 370.
110. Id.at 371.
111. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn, the Court held that each member of the class in a
diversity class action must satisfy the 510,000 jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a); class members whose claims amounted to less were not allowed to aggregate
their claims with other class members' claims. The Court in Owen stated that Aldinger and
Zahn both demonstrated that the satisfaction of the Gibbs "common nucleus of operative
fact" test "does not end the inquiry" into whether jurisdictional power exists over
nonfederal claims. 437 U.S. at 373. Zahn, in turn, was based on Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332 (1969), in which the Court held that the claim of each party, in which a separate
interest is at stake, constitutes a separate "matter in controversy" which, according to
section 1332, must be greater than $10,000. One author has suggested that the statutory
"civil action" could easily include more than one "matter in controversy." See Currie,
supra note 10, at 756. If this is correct, then Zahn arguably is inconsistent with Straw7
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), in which the Supreme Court construed the
diversity statute then in effect as requiring complete diversity between parties. Cases subsequent to Strawbridge extended the rule to nonjoint interests, see, e.g., Peninsular Iron Co.
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point out that "[clonstitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must
be overcome in determining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a
particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Article III of the Constitution, but also
by Acts of Congress." 112 The Court of Appeals had applied the Gibbs
"common nucleus of operative fact" test in Owen, an ancillary jurisdiction case,' 1 3 but the Supreme Court suggested that this test, if not invalid, might have been incomplete: the relation of the third-party
complaint to the original lawsuit must involve not "mere factual similarity, but logical dependence."'t4 In Owen, the plaintiff's claim against the
impleaded third party, because it was considered to be separate from and
independent of the original complaint, was found to constitute an entirely new claim rather than an ancillary one."15
v. Stone, 121 U.S. 631 (1887), meaning that a single matter in controversy might include a
number of separate claims, and that because there was nevertheless only one matter in
controversy, the presence of a nondiverse party would cause the dismissal of the entire suit.
See Currie, supra note 10, at 759. If, on the other hand, the claims of multiple, nonjoint
parties constitute separate matters in controversy, only the nondiverse parties would be
dismissed. By holding that the court had no power to hear the claims of absent class
members, the Court in Zahn apparently decided that these claims were not part of the
same cause of action. Id. at 757. The implication seems to be that the statutory "civil
action" does not include pendent parties. The problem is that this conclusion may be
inconsistent with the Strawbridge rule. Id. at 761. The author contends that the Court has
not carefully considered interpretations of the statutory language of section 1332 that led
to the conclusion that "civil action" should be construed broadly. Id. at 766. Had the
Owen Court relied specifically on the extended Strawbridge rule rather than on the narrow
holdings of Snyder and Zahn, taking into consideration the fact that section 1332 does not
explicitly require complete diversity, and that "civil action" could be interpreted to include claims brought against additional, nonfederal parties, it might have been able to
find statutory as well as constitutional power over the nondiverse pendent party.
112. 437 U.S. at 372.
113. Id. at 369.
114. Id. at 376.
115. See note 111 supra. An analysis of the facts of Owen, however, can lead to the
conclusion that ancillary jurisdiction would have been appropriate. The plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted when a crane belonging to the defendant Owen came in contact
with an electrical power line belonging to a power company, OPPD. The plaintiff
brought the original action against OPPD, a Nebraska corporation, alleging negligence in
the operation and maintenance of the power line. OPPD impleaded Owen for contribution, claiming that the accident was the result of Owen's negligence. The plaintiff
amended her complaint to include a negligence claim against Owen, which she believed
was also a Nebraska corporation. After the complaint against OPPD was dismissed on
OPPD's motion for summary judgment, Owen disclosed that it was actually an Iowa corporation. See 437 U.S. at 367-69. Despite the lack of diversity between Owen and the
plaintiff, arguably jurisdictional power existed with respect to the claim against Owen,
even under the Court's "logical dependence" requirement. OPPD could not have recovered contribution from Owen unless it could have proved that Owen was jointly liable,
along with OPPD, for the death of the plaintiff's decedent. In addition, Owen's liability
to the plaintiff depended on the same proof as OPPD's claim against Owen. See Garvey,
supra note 10, at 702-03, 712-14.
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In addition to finding the claim to be independent rather than ancillary, the Court held that to permit a plaintiff to circumvent the complete
diversity requirement of section 1332116 by bringing an action directly
against an impleaded nondiverse third party' t 7 would violate the intent
of Congress and the rule imposed by Aldinger. 1 8 As in Aldinger, the
Court did not rule on the validity of pendent party jurisdiction generally,
nor did it address directly the question of discretion. In dictum, however, it appeared to impose limitations similar to those implied by Adinger, stating:
It is not unreasonable to assume that, in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of
the federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal
rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.
Those practical needs are the basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. But neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of
the same State in a diversity case. 1 19
This statement would seem to mean that the requirements for jurisdictional power in a pendent party as predicated on diversity, that is, the
existence of both power' 20 under Article III, and compliance with the
complete diversity requirement of section 1332, diminish considerably
the significance of the Gibbs discretionary considerations. Courts may
still have the discretion not to exercise pendent party jurisdiction if the
power requirements are met but the Gibbs considerations are not present;
however, the presence of those considerations will not defeat the require2
ment of complete diversity.' '
Owen has been criticized for imposing a complete ban on the exercise
of jurisdiction over nondiverse third-party defendants. 122 Rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to implead
only "a person not a party to the action who is or who may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him."' 23 That is, a
defendant may bring into an action those persons against whom he could
make a claim for contribution or indemnity. Consequently, one could
expect the third-party complaint to be logically dependent upon the
original suit. However, this kind of "logical dependence," which the
116. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
117. See also Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 528 F.2d 764, 766 (4th Cir. 1975).
118. 437 U.S. at 373-75.
119. Id. at 377.
120. The Court stated that Gibbs "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power." Id. at 371. As in Aldinger, the "common nucleus of operative fact" test was
assumed to be valid, as far as it went. Se id. at 369.
121. See id.at 377.
122. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 702.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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Court considered crucial in Owen,124 is seldom found in other situations
in which ancillary jurisdiction is routinely permitted, such as those involving cross-claims, counterclaims, or intervention.125
The Court also based its decision, in part, on the fact that the plaintiff,
rather than the defendant, had chosen the federal forum.' 2 6 Considerations of "fairness" thus might be applied only to a defendant who was
brought into federal court unwillingly, rather than to a plaintiff who
could have foreseen jurisdictional problems and avoided them by bringing the action in state court.' 2 7 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that
the Gibbs approach remains the most reasonable one: all claims arising
from the same transaction should be recognized as potentially ancillary,
and the court should then determine, taking into consideration the issues
of fairness and judicial economy, whether the exercise of that jurisdiction
is appropriate. 128 In fact, the lower federal courts have generally continued to cite Gibbs as the basis for pendent party jurisdiction, often construing Owen and Aldnger as narrowly as possible.129 Although those two
decisions have added an additional obstacle to proving the existence of
jurisdictional power, 130 the lower courts have by no means eliminated
Gibbs or the notion of discretion from consideration in pendent party
cases.

IV.

THE ROLE OF DISCRETION AFTER OWEN AND ALDIAMGER

The Supreme Court so far has declined to rule on the general theoretical validity of pendent party jurisdiction, 13 although it has imposed significant limitations on jurisdictional power over pendent parties.132
Despite these limitations, the question of judicial discretion remains significant, not only in pendent party but in pendent and ancillary jurisdiction cases. Pendent jurisdiction, as described in Gibbs, commonly is
exercised in the lower federal courts.' 33 The use of ancillary jurisdiction
124. See 437 U.S. at 376.
125. Garvey, supra note 10, at 703.
126. The Court pointed out:
The nonfederal claim here was asserted by the plaintiff, who voluntarily chose to
bring suit upon a state-law claim in a federal court. By contrast, ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against
his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he
could assert them in an ongoing action in federal court. A plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not 'encompass all of his possible claims in a
case such as this one, since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the
state forum and must thus accept its limitations.
437 U.S. at 376 (footnote omitted).
127. See Garvey,iupra note 10, at 710-11.
128. Id. at 711.
129. See generally notes 221-383 infta and accompanying text.
130. See generally notes 77-121 supra and accompanying text.
131. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
132. See notes 77-121 supra and accompanying text.
133. 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3567, at 455-57.
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is commonplace under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 34 Even
pendent party jurisdiction, despite the uncertain status that has resulted
from the Supreme Court's cautious approach, appears relatively frequently. As might be expected, the factors that the courts use to decide
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate, although based essentially upon the Gibbs considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and
convenience,135 tend to vary considerably according to the parties involved and the causes of action asserted. For this reason an examination
of the circumstances under which courts have decided to exercise their
jurisdiction may be useful.
A.

PendentJursdiction

The issue of pendent jurisdiction has appeared in a wide variety of
circumstances. The Gibbs test for pendent jurisdiction can be fairly
called "fact-tied" 1 36 because it is, of course, the factual setting of each
case that will dictate whether pendent jurisdiction may be appropriate.
If the facts of a particular case fit into the Gibbs discretionary considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness, the court generally
will exercise its jurisdiction over the pendent claim.137
I.

Applications of Specifxc Factors

In Gibbs, the Court discussed other factors in addition to the commonly-cited considerations listed above. These factors are whether the
federal claims are dismissed before trial,138 whether state claims substantially predominate, 139 whether the state claim is closely related to questions of federal policy, 140 whether the state claim involves unsettled
questions of state law, 141 and whether jury confusion is likely to result.142
Courts have used all of these factors in a variety of ways. Often, the
matter of discretion is accorded little discussion, and jurisdiction will be
exercised or denied on a rather conclusory basis. For this reason, the
standards do not seem to be especially well-developed143 or consistently
134. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
135. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
136. See Note, supra note 11, at 641-42.
137. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3567, at 455-56.
138. 383 U.S. at 726.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 727.
141. See id. at 726.
142. Id. at 727; see, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 804
(3d Cir. 1978) (jury confusion likely in federal securities case in which plaintiff also asserted pendent state claim based on constructive trust theory), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930
(1979); Stowell v. Ted. S. Finkel Inv. Serv., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 1980);
Kerby v. Commodity Resources, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Colo. 1975).
143. See Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams, 83 F.R.D. 398, 402 (D. Mass. 1979). Another
federal court has taken a rather novel approach to pendent jurisdiction. In Louise B. v.
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applied.
Some courts attempt to explain their exercise of discretion in greater
detail, however. In Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams,144 the district court discussed at substantial length the matters it considered in deciding whether
to exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim. 14 5 The plaintiffs in that
case brought an action against the Secretary of Transportation and three
state officials to enjoin the construction of a road, alleging violations of
the National Environmental Policy Act146 and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. 14 7 After determining that it had jurisdictional
power over the state law claims, the court considered several "prudential" factors. 148 It found particularly significant the questions of whether
49
separate state and federal trials would produce inconsistent outcomes,1
whether the consolidation of all of the claims would result in the most
Coluatti, 606 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1979), a group of state employees who had been fired for
allegedly receiving welfare benefits to which they were not entitled, brought an action
against state officials, claiming violations of federal and state disclosure laws and violations of their right to due process. The trial court dismissed the first claim on the ground
that no substantial federal question existed, and the due process claim on the ground that
no termination hearing was required. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
confidentiality claim could be made pendent to the constitutional privacy claim. This
holding is unusual because the "pendent" claim and the claim to which it was made
pendent were both based on federal law. The court explained its decision as follows:
District courts possess a degree of discretion in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims. Even where pendent state claims are involved, however, considerations of economy and convenience generally favor the
adjudication of pendent claims where there is no resulting unfairness to the litigants. . . . Where pendent federal claims are involved, the extent of a district
court's discretion to refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction is more limited since
most of the factors that might weigh against exercising jurisdiction over state
claims do not apply. Specifically, state-federal comity is not a consideration;
there is no need to defer to the state courts' expertise since federal courts have at
least as much experience in deciding federal questions; and, although federal
decisions on state issue [sic] are, in effect, only tentative, federal decisions of federal issues suffer from no similar defect. . . . Thus there appears to be little reason in most cases to refuse, as a matter of discretion, to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over a federal claim especially when doing so would avoid the need
to reach a constitutional issue.
Id. at 400-01 n.12 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Although the court cited a
number of factors commonly used as a basis for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, it
found that those factors that militate against a federal court's hearing state law claims are
not present when the pendent claim is federal. However, it failed to recognize a fact that
the concurring opinion took pains to emphasize: if a federal question is present, a claim
based upon it is not a pendent claim at all, and any discussion of pendent jurisdiction is
simply irrelevant. Id. at 402-03 (Rosenn, J., concurring ). Louise B. is illustrative of the
unusual interpretations that can result from a misunderstanding of the pendent jurisdiction theory.
144. 83 F.R.D. 398 (D. Mass. 1979).
145. Id. at 403-06.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976).
147. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, §§ 62-62H (West 1978).
148. 83 F.R.D. at 402-06.
149. Id. at 404.
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efficient use ofjudicial resources, ' 50 and whether the federal court should
consider unsettled questions of state law.ist
a. PendentJurisdiction and the Abstention Doctrines
In Gibbs, the Court stated that the presence of unsettled questions of
state law that arise in connection with a pendent claim may be a factor
weighing strongly in favor of the dismissal of the claim.152 The reason
for this approach is the same as that underlying the abstention doctrines,
which is that principles of comity and federalism dictate that, as a rule,
the state courts should have the right to adjudicate exclusively state law
matters.15 3 Because the Gibbs factor of unsettled state law questions
bears this similarity to the abstention doctrines, confusion may arise
when courts decide to dismiss claims based on unsettled state law
questions.
The abstention doctrines may be applied in several situations. In Pullman abstention, a federal court may decline to hear a case in which the
constitutionality of a state law may be dispositive of the case. 154 In Burford abstention, the court refrains from unnecessary interference with a
state's administration of its own affairs. This type of abstention is usually
applied when the state has devised a comprehensive regulatory scheme to
handle a particular matter. 55 On occasion, federal courts also have
been asked to abstain when no constitutional question or no extensive
state regulatory system is present, but when the case may be resolved by
a decision on an unsettled state law question.156 The courts generally
have held that the mere presence of such a question is by itself an insufficient basis for abstention. 157 Gibbs advises, however, that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided."158 As a result, a court might find
some justification for declining to exercise jurisdiction over a pendent
state law claim, even in cases in which abstention might be inappropriate
because of the lack of a constitutional question or a lack of pervasive
state regulation.
In Roxse Homes, the court acknowledged the presence of a number of
unsettled state law questions that arose in conjunction with the pendent
150. Id. at 404-05.

151. Id. at 405-06.
152. See 383 U.S. at 727.
153. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 52.
154. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
155. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
156. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943).
157. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 17, § 52.
158. 383 U.S. at 726.
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claims. 159 Nevertheless, the court decided that the existence of an unsettled state law question was an unsufficient reason for declining to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent claim.160 This was especially true in
light of the availability of a procedure by which the federal court could
avoid deciding unsettled state questions by certifying them to the state
court while maintaining jurisdiction over the main action.161 In a Minnesota Federal District Court decision with almost identical facts, however, the court reached the opposite conclusion. In Minnesota Pub/ic
Interest Research Group v. Adams 162 (MPIRG), as in Roxse Homes, the plaintiffs brought suit against the Secretary of Transportation and a group of
state officials, alleging violations of the national Environmental Policy
Act and two state environmental statutes. 163 Rather than certifying the
state law questions to the state supreme court,164 however, the district
court simply declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over those
claims.165 The court stated that, although it had the power to hear the
claims,166 it "concluded that its discretion is best exercised by declining
to assume jurisdiction over the pendent state claims"16 7 on the ground
that "principles of abstention, comity and primary jurisdiction have
compelled the conclusion that the discretion vested in the Court under
Gibbs should be employed to dismiss the pendent claims."168 Because of
the state's "regulatory mechanism"169 for the issuance of highway construction permits, and its concern with its own environmental policies,
principles of primary jurisdiction required the federal court to defer to
the expertise of the state agencies." 17o Relying also on the theory of Burford abstention,171 the court decided that, because the pendent claim involved a "state policy in an area in which Minnesota has expressed a
paramount concern .

.

. sound judicial administration requires this

court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the state law claims."172
In its conclusion, the court stated that it had decided to dismiss the
pendent claims in accordance with the discretionary power conferred by
159. 83 F.R.D. at 405-06.
160. See id. at 406.
161. See id.
162. 482 F. Supp. 170 (D. Minn. 1979).
163. Id. at 173.
164. The uniform Certification of Questions Law Act, MINN. STAT. § 480.061 (1980),
provides that the highest state court may answer questions of state law certified to it by a
federal court or by the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of another state. Id. § 480.061(1).
165. See 482 F. Supp. at 182.
166. Id. at 180.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 182.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Gibbs.173 Citing Moor v. County of Alameda,' 74 a pendent party case, the
court commented that the presence of an unsettled state law question
could serve as a factor in a court's decision to decline jurisdiction over a
pendent claim. 175 The MPIRG court cited HousatonicRiver v. GeneralElectric Co.,176 an abstention case, as authority for its statement that an unsettled state law issue should be determined by a state regulatory system
created especially to handle such issues if state policies could be disrupted by a federal court's consideration of those issues.177
The problem with the MPIRG decision is that it confuses two different
doctrines; it is not entirely clear whether the court actually based its decision not to exercise pendent jurisdiction on Burford abstention, as the
above quotation implies, or upon the theoretically related statement in
Gibbs that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a
matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law."178
By failing to distinguish clearly between abstention and pendent jurisdiction theories, the MPIRG court may have created unnecessary confusion concerning the weight to be accorded to the presence of unsettled
state law questions. A court that wished to decline jurisdiction over a
pendent state law claim involving such issues arguably could do so simply by relying on the Gibbs guidelines; the presence of the "special" or
"exceptional" circumstances normally required by the abstention doctrines 179 thus would be unnecessary.
On the other hand, one could argue that if the factors necessary for
either Pullman or Burford abstention are not present, a court should have
no discretion at all to dismiss a pendent claim merely because it involves
unsettled state law issues. The Supreme Court's statement in Meredith v.
City of Winter Haven 80 that "the difficulties of ascertaining what the state
courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves
afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction" 18

is in a sense difficult to reconcile with the Court's later

determination in Gibbs that the presence of an unsettled state law question is a factor to be given considerable weight in a decision to dismiss a
pendent claim.182 Gibbs does not say, however, that unsettled state law
173. Id.
174. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
175. 482 F. Supp. at 182.
176. 462 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1978).
177. 482 F. Supp. at 182.
178. 383 U.S. at 726.
179. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 387 (1964); Herald Co. v. McNeal, 553 F.2d
1125, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1977); Augustin v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1216-17 (8th Cir.
1975).
180. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).

181. Id. at 234.
182. See 383 U.S. at 726-27.
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questions must always be dismissed; it is apparent that the Court intended a balancing of the basic needs for judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness against the necessity of allowing state courts to make decisions concerning state law.18 3 Particularly in those cases in which a certification procedure is available, it may be difficult to justify the dismissal
of a pendent claim for the sole reason that the underlying state law question has not been decided by a state court.
The MPIRG court may have reached a correct decision for the wrong
reasons. If Burford abstention had been proper, discretion under Gibbs
might be irrelevant; conversely, if the state law question had been one
not previously addressed by the state court, but abstention nevertheless
was inappropriate, perhaps Gibbs could not justify a refusal to exercise
pendent jurisdiction unless factors favoring its exercise were found to be
absent. 184
b.

Inconsistent Results andJudicialEconomy

The Roxse Homes case contained a thoughtful discussion of the question
of whether separate state and federal trials are likely to produce inconsistent results. 18 5 Although this issue was not specifically raised in Gibbs ,186
183. See id.
184. The abstention issue has appeared in other pendent jurisdiction cases. In Yaretsky v. Blum, 456 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the plaintiffs, residents of certain health
care facilities, brought an action to contest the state's transfer procedures, alleging that
these procedures violated their due process rights. Id. at 654. They also alleged that certain memoranda issued by the state health department were not rules according to state
law. Id. at 655. The state contended that the court should abstain from hearing the latter
claim according to the principles of Pullman abstention. Id. at 656. The court held Pu/man to be inapplicable, however, because a resolution of the state law question would not
eliminate the necessity of a federal constitutional decision, and because the state courts'
expertise was not necessary. Id. Having determined abstention to be inappropriate, the
court, citing Gibbs, assumed pendent jurisdiction over the state claim. Id.
An argument based on Pullman abstention also appeared in a case decided by the
same court that decided MPIRG. In Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 478 F. Supp.
418 (D. Minn. 1979), the court considered the issue of Pu//man abstention sua sponte, and
stated tl-aiia]bstention is not proper where the resolution of the state law issues would
not change the nature of the constitutional claim, or obviate the need to determine the
constitutional claim." 478 F. Supp. at 424 n.6. The court assumed pendent jurisdiction
over the state law claim, commenting also that "the propriety of abstention is theoretically
distinct from the well established federal policy of refraining from constitutional adjudication where a nonconstitutional pendent claim is dispositive of the case ....

"

478 F.

Supp. at 424-25 n.6.
185. 83 F.R.D. at 404. The court noted:
The total procedural system, state and federal, provides opportunities to
resolve conflicts, and it is at least a defensible proposition that outcomes legally
recognized as conflicting should not occur if all parties exercise their procedural
rights. Nevertheless, because of either the costs of review or the risks of unforeseen procedural shoals, conflicting outcomes are possible in practice. Moreover,
outcomes that intricate analysis shows to be consistent may nonetheless create a
disturbing appearance of conflict. An appearance of inconsistency may be created even when federal and state claims are adjudicated in one action, but ordi-
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it is an aspect of the fairness consideration. The Roxse Homes court
pointed out that inconsistent results are particularly likely to occur, for
example, if statutes of limitations or other state and federal procedures
differ from each other:
Though having generally common objectives, NEPA and MEPA, as
well as the precedents applying them, create different requirements,

both substantive and procedural. Outcomes determining that a given
course of conduct satisfies the requirements of one of these statutes but
not the other are more likely to give the appearance of inconsistent
adjudications, rather than consistent adjudications based on different
state and federal regulations, if the actions are tried in different courts
than if they are tried together.

187

If jurisdiction over the state claims is denied, the plaintiff will be required to bring them in state court. To avoid the problems that holding
two separate trials will be likely to create,188 the plaintiff might decide to
bring the entire suit, rather than just the state claims, in state court.18 9
The result of this decision can lead to a relinquishing of the possibility of
a definitive federal court ruling on a federal matter. 90
The problem of inconsistent results is closely related to the issue of
judicial economy.' 9' Even if the results of state and federal trials were
likely to be the same, judicial resources might be employed unnecessarily
narily the risks of the fact or the appearance of inconsistency and conflict of
outcome are higher when the claims are adjudicated in different tribunals.

Id.
186. See 383 U.S. at 726-27.

187. 83 F.R.D. at 404.
188. In addition to the possibility of issue or claim preclusion, these problems include
expense, delay, and contradictory holdings. See id. at 405.
189. A plaintiff would be precluded from bringing his entire suit in state court in a
number of situations in which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claim. Claims of this type include those arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
the federal antitrust laws, and the patent and copyright laws. The fact that a plaintiff
would be foreclosed from having such claims heard at all unless they were brought in
federal court would require that plaintiff to litigate two separate actions if federal jurisdiction over the related state claims was declined. The Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976), mentioned this problem as a factor favoring the exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction. The argument can be applied with equal force to ordinary
pendent jurisdiction. See McGowan v. Williams, 481 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
190. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1363. This situation can cause difficulties, particularly in civil rights cases brought under section 1983. These cases involve claims of unconstitutional actions by states, and state courts frequently have been accused of
ineffectiveness in fashioning remedies when the state is the defendant. If, however, the
action is divided between the state and federal court, instead of being brought entirely in
state court, the plaintiff runs the risk of preclusion by the result of whichever action first
reaches judgment. Id. at 1363-64; see notes 194-99 in7fa and accompanying text.
191. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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to adjudicate essentially the same matters.19 2 As the Roxse Homes court
pointed out,
The interests of justice are best served by avoiding the commitment of
resources to duplicative trials. Among the reasons are these: First, justice priced high may be beyond the means of both parties. Second, the
potential burden of high cost may fall differently on the parties and
coerce an "agreed" disposition that is at odds with declared entitlements. Third, in both state and federal court systems, overloaded
dockets are a perennial problem; requiring duplicative trials wastes
scarce resources that are sorely needed in the administration of
justice. 193
The court noted that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel t94 might operate to prevent the relitigation of issues in many cases;
nevertheless, the results of the application of these doctrines might be
uncertain.195 Normally a party who loses the first lawsuit will be barred
from relitigating the same issues in a second suit.196 This rule is subject
to a number of exceptions, however, especially if the suit involves multiple parties. 197 Furthermore, the rules of preclusion vary among the
states' 98 and between the state and federal systems. 199 Therefore res
judicata and collateral estoppel may not always be relied upon to prevent either duplication of judicial efforts or inconsistent results. In cases
in which it is apparent that these problems will arise, Gibbs provides a
strong argument in favor of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
192. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970); Mazzare v. Burroughs
Corp., 473 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
193. 83 F.R.D. at 405.
194. Res judicata is the principle according to which a valid final judgment on the
merits bars any subsequent actions between the same parties based on the same claims.
1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 621 (2d ed. 1974). Collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of the same issues by the same parties, whether or not the cause of action
in a later suit is the same as that in the first. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
195. 83 F.R.D. at 405.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
197. See generally Vestal, Precusion/ResJudcata Vanables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27
(1964).
198. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has formulated a rule according to
which the determination in the first suit of a party's nonnegligence may be used against a
person not a party to the first suit in a subsequent attempt by the latter to obtain contribution. Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1979). This rule, so far, is
unique to Minnesota; if an action involving similar facts were to be split between a Minnesota court and a federal court, the confusion already generated by Hart would probably
increase.
199. The Supreme Court has stated that the district courts have broad discretion in
applying collateral estoppel principles. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 33132 (1979).
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Dismissal of the FederalClaim Prior to Trial

Occasionally the federal claim to which a state claim is made pendent
will be dismissed before trial, raising the issue of whether the state claim
also should be dismissed. Gibbs states that "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."200 Some courts have

taken this statement to mean that the state claim must be dismissed if the
federal claim is dismissed prior to trial.201 Others have concluded that it
is simply a guide to the exercise of discretion.20 2 It is clear that jurisdictional power over pendent claims must be present before the court has
any discretion to exercise;203 no such power exists unless the federal claim
is substantial.20 4 Therefore a state claim that is pendent to an insubstantial federal claim must be dismissed along with the federal claim because
the court never had any power to decide it.205 Gibbs says that state
claims "should" be dismissed even if the federal claims that are dismissed
before trial are "not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense."206 This
statement sounds mandatory, yet a court that has acquired power over
pendent state claims by virtue of the substantiality of the federal questions raised hardly can be said to have lost that power because of the
dismissal of the federal claim.2O7 The Supreme Court has held that a
federal court retained its power over pendent issues after the dismissal of
a federal question for mootness.20 8 If jurisdictional power exists, under
Gibbs the court has the discretion to hear the pendent claim,209 although
the Gibbs court definitely discouraged the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
if the federal claims already have been dismissed.210 Other factors, how200. 383 U.S. at 726.
201. See, e.g., Crocker v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229, 232-33 (D. Mass. 1980); Foreman v.
General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 181 (E.D. Mich. 1979); O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F.
Supp. 1161, 1167 (D. Md. 1979), aJ'd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1124
(1981).
202. Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see notes 212-20 infira and
accompanying text.
203. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966); notes 48-55 supra
and accompanying text.
204. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
205. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 1979);
Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 448 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979); Doe v. Klein, 599 F.2d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 1979); Neiger v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 622, 630 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
206. 383 U.S. at 726.
207. An argument could be made, however, that the federal court's power over the
pendent claim is so tied to its power over the federal anchor claim that if the federal claim
is no longer before the court, the court has no continuing power over the additional,
nonfederal claim.
208. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970).
209. 383 U.S. at 726-27; see text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
210. 383 U.S. at 726; see Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir.
1974).
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ever, could weigh against the dismissal of the pendent claim.211
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently has stated that
this matter is purely discretionary. In Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,212 the
plaintiffs federal securities claim, which the court acknowledged to be
substantial,213 was dismissed because the two-year statute of limitations
had run. 2 14 A pendent claim based on common-law fraud also was dis-

missed, but the court noted that "the dismissal of the federal securities
claim before trial, standing alone, did not compel dismissal of the state
fraud claim."215 If the federal claim is substantial, giving rise to jurisdictional power, the retention of jurisdiction over the state claim is more
than likely discretionary. 2 16 Such claims will be dismissed, however, unless some unusual circumstances are present.217
To find unusual circumstances, courts probably would require a showing that the plaintiff would suffer undue hardship if the pendent claims
were dismissed. In Koke, the court suggested that important factors
would include the difficulty of the state law claim, the burden on judicial
resources, the amount ofjudicial time and effort already expended on the
claim, and the availability of a state forum. 218 Because the plaintiff in
Koke was not foreclosed from bringing her claim in state court, and in
fact had already filed a state claim, the court, influenced by considerations of comity,219 determined that the dismissal would cause the plaintiff no unnecessary injury. 220 Normally the dismissal of the pendent
claim under such circumstances will be without prejudice, and the plaintiff whose federal claim has already failed may bring the dismissed state
action in state court.
B.

Pendent Party Jurisdiction

Courts often apply the same discretionary considerations in pendent
22
party cases as those used in pendent jurisdiction cases. ' Nevertheless,
some courts have sought to circumvent the Supreme Court's recent limi211. See Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 528 F.2d 767, 771 n.6 (8th Cir.
1976).
212. 620 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1980).
213. Id. at 1346.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1265 (D. Conn.
1979).
218. 620 F.2d at 1346 (citing Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 528 F.2d 767
(8th Cir. 1976)).
219. Id. at 1346-47.
220. See id. at 1347.
221. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714-16 (1973); Almenares v.
Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denid, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Brame v.
Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 593-94 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
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tations on jurisdictional power over pendent parties by employing extremely broad discretion. 222 Other courts, while acknowledging the
presence of jurisdictional power over pendent parties, nevertheless have
dismissed claims against them. 223 A decision to dismiss some claims frequently is based upon consideration of the Gibbs factors,224 but courts
also have used other justifications. This section will examine the discretionary factors applied in pendent party cases after Owen and Aldinger in
an attempt to determine whether, and to what extent, those decisions
have affected the discretionary exercise of pendent party jurisdiction.
L

Exclusive FederalJurisdiction over the Anchor Claim

In many cases, the federal district courts have exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over the federal anchor claim.2 25 Under these circumstances,
a stronger argument can be made in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction
over pendent parties than could be advanced in cases in which the plaintiff could obtain a remedy in a state court. 226 The Ald'nger Court stated
in dictum that "[w]hen the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive . . . the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be
coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal court may all
of the claims be tried together."2 2 7 This statement has served as the basis
for a number of district courts' decisions to exercise pendent party
jurisdiction.228
a. Cases Brought Under the Federal Tort Clains Act
The Aldinger Court cited Federal Tort Claims Act cases as an example
of those that might involve the appropriate use of pendent party jurisdiction. 229 Under this statute, all tort claims against the United States must
be brought in federal court. 230 A plaintiff who brings such an action and
who wishes to join an additional party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists and, in addition, seeks to assert a nonfederal claim
against that party must rely upon the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction to do so.2 3 1 Because tort claims often involve multiple parties, the
222. See, e.g., Wood v. Standard Prods. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Va. 1978); notes
277-307 infra and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Aztec Enterprises, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 211, 218
(M.D. La. 1980); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 683 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
224. See 383 U.S. at 726-27.
225. See notes 229-307 infia and accompanying text.
226. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
227. Id. (emphasis in original).
228. See, e.g., Wood v. Standard Prods. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v.
S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977).
229. 427 U.S. at 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
231. See notes 64-76 supra and accompanying text.
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issues of pendent jurisdiction and pendent party jurisdiction appear frequently in Federal Tort Claims Act cases. In those circuits that recognize pendent party jurisdiction,2 32 the trend appears to be that the
district courts will exercise their discretion in favor of adjudicating state
2 33
law claims asserted against nonfederal parties.
The Aldinger Court apparently intended the existence of exclusive jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act to be a discretionary factor
that the district courts should consider in deciding whether to exercise
pendent party jurisdiction. 234 It has been so applied in many of the cases
that have been decided since A/dinger. 23 5 In a few cases, however, it has
beep used as a means of establishing jurisdictional power over pendent
236
parties.
In Maltas v. United States, 237 the plaintiff brought a negligence action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, individually and as executrix of the estate of her husband, who was killed while
working on a construction project on government property. 238 In addition, the plaintiff sought damages against seven corporate defendants
based on breach of warranty and strict products liability. 239 The United
States cross-claimed against some of the corporate defendants and impleaded the decedent's employer. Its claims were premised upon contractual indemnification provisions and principles of contribution and
indemnity. 240 One of the corporate defendants then requested dismissal
of the nonfederal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, raising the
241
issue of whether pendent party jurisdiction was appropriate.
The court held that it had the power to hear the pendent party claims
brought in conjunction with a Federal Tort Claims Act case. 242 Its decision was based upon several considerations. First, the federal courts have
232. At this time, only the Ninth Circuit has refused to accept the doctrine of pendent
party jurisdiction, and has consistently held that no constitutional power exists with respect to pendent parties. Sea Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
dismirsed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), a 'd,
427 U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aj'dsub nom. Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, rehearing denied, 412 U.S. 963 (1973); Hymer v. Chai,
407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. United States, 402 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969). In
Ayala, the court stated that it was "not bound by new dictum in Aldingar" and declined to
acknowledge the theory until such time as the Supreme Court had made a more definite
statement on the issue. 550 F.2d at 1200.
233. See notes 237-95 infza and accompanying text.
234. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
235. See notes 237-307 infta and accompanying text.
236. See id.
237. 439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
238. Id. at 543-44.
239. Id. at 544.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 542.
242. Id. at 544.
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exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Act. 24 3 Furthermore, the Act provides the courts with the power to hear

"any set-off, counterclaim, or other claim or demand whatever on the
part of the United States against any plaintiff."2 44 According to the
court, this language demonstrated Congress' intent that the extent of the
United States' tort liability be determined in a single action.245 Second,
the factual situation in Maltaif was found to have satisfied the Gibbs constitutional requirement of claims arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact.2 46 Third, the court pointed out that "under the Federal
Tort Claims Act pendent-party jurisdiction would not necessarily bring
parties before a federal court that would not otherwise be subject to fed2 7
eral jurisdiction." 4
The court's analysis, although initially convincing, is flawed in several
respects. If the nonfederal parties were properly before the court on the
basis of ancillary jurisdiction, they would not be true pendent parties; the
243. Id. at 547. The Maltais court, having found jurisdictional power over the additional defendants, went on to address the discretionary matters:
Some of the myriad factors which a federal court should take into account
when called upon to exercise pendent jurisdiction over additional claims or parties include considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants, the character of the federal and nonfederal claims presented, the law to be
applied, and the possibility ofjury confusion. Thus, if the federal claim supporting a pendent claim is insubstantial, a court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction
over the nonfederal claim.
Id. at 549. The court indicated that a court may decline jurisdiction over a nonfederal
claim, but substantiality of the federal claim is clearly a prerequisite to a finding of jurisdictional power. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court stated that such power exists :f, "assuming
substantiality of the federal issues," the plaintiff would be expected to try all claims in the
same proceeding. 383 U.S. at 725. In Malais, however, substantiality apparently was
considered to be a discretionary factor.
244. 439 F. Supp. at 547.
245. Id.
246. Id. The court also noted that both the federal and state claims arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, but it did not point out that this is the threshold constitutional requirement for a finding of jurisdictional power. Id. at 547-48; see Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
247. 439 F. Supp. at 548. The court also noted that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the United States could implead a third party on a claim for contribution or indemnity, and that if some of the corporate defendants had not been named in the plaintiff's
complaint, the United States probably would have impleaded those corporations. Id. Because the United States opposed the demand of one of the defendants for dismissal of the
pendent claims, it was apparent that the United States was attempting to protect its crossclaims against the corporate defendants. Id. The court stated that "the ultimate monetary liability of the United States cannot be determined with finality in a single lawsuit
unless all the parties to this action are properly brought before this Court." Id. The court
also commented that "it would be permissible for plaintiff to amend her complaint against
all seven corporate defendants if the United States had brought them into this action by
third-party complaint." Id. This was the situation that the Supreme Court later found
impermissible in the context of diversity jurisdiction in Owen Equip. and Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See notes 101-30 supra and accompanying text.
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theory of pendent party jurisdiction need not be raised at all if the parties are otherwise subject to federal jursidiction. Furthermore, in applying the pendent party theory, the court seems to have used an apparently
diwretionay factor, the lack of an alternative forum, as a basis for a finding ofjurisdictionalpower. As stated above, the court relied on the exclusive federal jursidiction conferred by the Act as one of the bases for
jurisdictional power over the "pendent" parties.248 The inclusion within
this grant ofjurisdiction of the power to hear all tort claims by or against
the United States was held to constitute evidence of Congress' intent that
the United States' liability under the Act be decided in one lawsuit.249
However, dictum in Aldinger, which the Maltais court cited in support
of its statutory power argument, 250 indicates that the lack of an alternative forum was instead intended to be a discretionary factor that courts
should consider in determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised,
once both statutory and constitutional power are established. The AMdinger Court stated that "the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal
court may all of the claims be tried together."251 Judicial economy and
convenience are two of the discretionary considerations set forth in
Gibbs.252 It would appear, then, that by discussing that alternative forum factor along with the well-established Gibbs considerations, the
Court demonstrated its intent that this factor also be used as a discretionary consideration.
Courts that have considered pendent party claims brought in conjunction with actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act frequently have
concluded, as did the Maltais court, that jurisdiction both could and
should be exercised over such claims.253 These courts' analyses of the
248. 439 F. Supp. at 549.
249. Id. at 547.
250. Id.
251. 427 U.S. at 18.
252. 383 U.S. at 726.
253. See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1979); Dick Meyers Towing
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979); Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1979); Maltais v.
United States, 439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Kack v. United States, 570 F.2d
754 (8th Cir. 1978); Price v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
In Kack v. United States, 570 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1978), in which the plaintiff attempted to assert state law claims against an additional party in an action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the court cited C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (2d ed. 1970) in support of its conclusion that pendent jurisdiction
may be used only with respect to claims rather than parties. 570 F.2d at 757. In a later
district court case brought under the Act, Ausland v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 426
(N.D.S.D. 1980), the court sought to avoid the Eighth Circuit's precedent in Kack, first by
pointing out that in a later edition of the treatise upon which the Kack court relied, the
author acknowledged the increasing use of pendent party jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (3d ed. 1976), and second, by noting
that the Eighth Circuit had, in fact, approved the use of pendent party jurisdiction in two
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bases of power and discretion, however, tend to be more closely aligned
with Gibbs than with Aldinger, and developed a liberal approach to the
problem despite Aldinger. Several recent cases demonstrate this
tendency.
In Pearce v. United States, 254 the court held that it had jurisdictional
power over the claims asserted against pendent parties, which were
raised in conjunction with claims brought against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court based its conclusion in
part on a Tenth Circuit decision, Transok P'pehe Co. v. Dark,255 in which,
as in Maltais, the fact that only in federal court could all of the claims be
tried at once 256 was used as a basis for statutory jurisdictional power.
earlier cases, Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973), and Hatridge v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969). Both of these cases were decided
before Owen and Aldiger. The Ausland court had no difficulty avoiding the Aldnger jurisdictional limitations, however, commenting only that "the Court in Aldinger v. Howard...
refused to exercise jurisdiction because of statutory provisions not applicable here." 488 F.
Supp. at 429. Relying on Haridge and Schulman, the court decided that pendent party
jurisdiction both could and should be exercised, stating:
The analysis in Haridge and Schulman convinces this court that it has discretion
to assert jurisdiction over all the claims in this lawsuit, and that the footnote in
Iack should not be read as mandating an opposite conclusion.
The next question to be determined is whether this discretion should be
exercised. The court concludes that it should. This conclusion is based primarily on considerations of judicial economy and convenience of the parties. As
noted by the Supreme Court in A/dinger, . . . the case can be tried only in a
federal court if it is to be tried together rather than in separate actions.
Id. at 430 (emphasis in original). The Ausland court, while more or less ignoring Aldinger's
jurisdictional tests, correctly determined that the Aldinger dictum regarding the exercise of
jurisdiction in Federal Tort Claims Act cases was a discretionary factor related to the
considerations of judicial economy and fairness.
254. 450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1978). The plaintiff, a citizen of Kansas, was injured
in a car accident, and was admitted to a hospital in Shawnee Mission, Kansas, where he
remained for several hours without treatment. He was then transferred to a veterans'
hospital in Kansas City, Missouri, where he allegedly remained for over 15 hours without
treatment. The plaintiff claimed damages for both hospitals' negligence in failing to treat
him, which allegedly resulted in the aggravation of his injuries. Id. at 614. The action
against the veterans' hospital, which was operated by the Veterans Administration, was
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The private hospital brought a motion to
dismiss the negligence claim against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
255. 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977). A pipeline company brought an action to condemn an easement for the underground storage of natural gas under an Oklahoma statute. A federal statute authorized the condemnation of property allotted in severalty to
Indians in the same manner as lands owned in fee. Two of the defendant land owners
were not Indians, but were cotenants with restricted Indians. Id. at 1151. The non-Indian
defendants contended that the federal court had no jurisdiction over them because the
statute referred only to the condemnation of land allotted to Indians. Id. at 1154.
256. Id. at 1155. Before discussing discretionary considerations, the court sought to
justify the finding of jurisdictional power over the non-Indian defendants, citing the Aidinger dictum:
The federal claims must, however, be substantial. In our case the claims
quite clearly arise out of the same factual nucleus and normally a condemnor
would seek to have all interests in the property adjudicated in one action. Fur-
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The Pearce court, however, found some of its implied statutory power 25 7
in the provision of the Act that states that the United States shall be
liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."258 This provision, the court said, may be
read as encouraging the joinder of pendent parties.259 Having found jurisdictional power, the court went on to consider certain discretionary
matters. 26o In doing so, it attempted to distinguish Aldinger in several
respects. The first distinction was based upon the fact that all of the
claims in Pearce could be litigated only in federal court. 26 t Additionally,
the state and federal claims asserted in Pearce were based upon the same
theories,2 62 since the United States' liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act is determined according to state law.263 The court noted,
perhaps inaccurately,264 that "[w]ithout doubt a significant factor underthermore, our case is similar to the test discussed in Aldinger; under § 357, there is
exclusive jurisdiction to try the federal claim, whereby there can be a trial of all
of the claims only in a federal court.
Id. Note also that in discussing the Gibbs test for jurisdictional power, the court, by using
the conjunctive "and" rather than the disjunctive "but" that appears in Gibbs,see 383 U.S.
at 725, apparently assumed that a court has jurisdiction over pendent claims only when
the federal claim is substantial, the claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact,
and may be expected to be tried together. This is perhaps an inaccurate reading, and may
set up a test for power over pendent claims that is more restrictive than the Gibbs court
intended.
257. See 450 F. Supp. at 619.
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
259. 450 F. Supp. at 619.
260. See id. The court decided in favor of exercising pendent jurisdiction over the
nonfederal defendant despite the likelihood that certain procedural difficulties would
arise. Id. at 619-21. The nonfederal defendant had a right to a jury trial, while tort claims
against the United States are tried to the court. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976); see Stowell v.
Ted S. Finkel Inv. Serv., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1980). In addition, conflicts of
law problems were likely because some of the acts complained of occurred in Kansas,
which had a comparative negligence statute, and others took place in Missouri. The court
nevertheless found that "such difficulties are not insurmountable. In any event, the mere
possibility of procedural difficulties does not warrant the dismissal of plaintiff's claim
against [the nonfederal defendant] at this time in view of the other factors in favor of
retaining jurisdiction over the claim." 450 F. Supp. at 621.
261. 450 F. Supp. at 619-20.
262. Id. at 620.
263. Id. Although state law would be applied to all claims, certain difficulties may
have presented themselves with respect to which law to apply, since the plaintiff suffered
some of his injuries in Kansas and others in Missouri. See id. at 621.
264. The court cited no specific language in Aldinger to support its statement that the
basis for the result in that case was that the state and federal claims required different
standards of proof. In 4ldinger, as the Pearce court pointed out, it was suggested that, since
counties were excluded from section 1983 liability, the jurisidiction over civil actions given
the district courts under section 1343(3) "should not be so broadly read as to bring them
back within that power merely because the facts also give rise to an ordinary civil action
against them under state law." 427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original). Although the "standards of proof' required in an ordinary civil action such as a common law tort would be
different from those necessary in a civil rights claim under section 1983, this factor does
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lying the result in Aldinger is that different standards of proof were required to sustain the plaintiff's state and federal claims."265
Furthermore, the defendants in Pearce were alleged to be joint tortfeasors,
a fact that under some circumstances could result in a loss of the defendants' contribution rights if the claims were tried separately.266 The Pearce
court relied on the following language:
The case of a joint tort-feasor made a defendant in a case under the

Federal Tort Claims Act is peculiarly appropriate for the application of
the principle of 'the conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation' because the 'plaintiff's claims are such that
267
he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one proceeding.'
This language obviously is derived from Gibbs.268 Once again, how-

ever, the concepts of jurisdictional power and judicial discretion seem to
have become confused. According to Gibbs, jurisdictional power exists if
the claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact such that the
269
plaintiff would be expected to try them all in the same proceeding
270
The
meaning that the court has the power to hear the whole "case."
not seem to be the focus of the Aldinger Court's discussion. First, if the county had not
been dismissed from the action, its liabiliy would have been determined under state law,
while that of the other defendants would have been considered with respect to section
1983. If a party is sued on the independent basis of diversity of citizenship, the standards
of proof would also be different from that required in section 1983 cases. As long as the
court has jurisdiction over all parties, the presence of different theories of law in the same
action does not necessarily require the dismissal of parties or claims, although the possibility of jury confusion is one of the factors cited in Gibbs as weighing in favor of dismissal.
383 U.S. at 727. Clearly the result in Aldinger, however, was based upon the Court's interpretation of Congress' intent that municipalities were to be immune from liability under
section 1983, and that therefore a plaintiff should not be permitted to assert common-law
pendent claims against them in federal court. See 427 U.S. at 17. The real basis for the
Court's decision is that "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to the
well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general
jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress." 427 U.S. at 15.
265. 450 F. Supp. at 620.
266. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D.N.Y.
1970)).
267. Id. at 620 (quoting Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D.N.Y.
1970)).
268. See 383 U.S. at 725; notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
269. 383 U.S. at 725.
270. See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillaqy and PendentJurisdiction,33 U.
i-rr. L. REv. 759, 764-65 (1972). According to Professor Baker, the meaning given the
word "case" by the Gibbs Court may be ascertained by the grammatical construction of
the court's test for jurisdictional power, which is as follows:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court ....
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operaconsidered without regard to their federal or state character, a
tive fact. But if,
plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in the federal courts to hear the whole.
383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added in part). Professor Baker states that the first of the three
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conclusion that may be inferred from the above statement in Pearce, however, is that the discretionary factor of judicial economy always will be
significant whenever jurisdictional power, based on the presence of common claims that the plaintiff would be expected to try together, is found
to exist. Following this logic, once such power is determined to be present, a court would be almost compelled to exercise its power over pendent claims or parties, at least if no countervailing factors were present,
because of the significance given the consideration of judicial economy in
Gibbs and subsequent cases.
b.

Other Statutes Conferring Exclusive FederalJurisdiction

The Aldinger dictum has provided courts with authority for upholding
pendent party jurisdiction, not only in actions brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, but in those arising under other federal statutes granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. In Morse Electro Products
Corp. v. S.S Great Peace,271 a case arising under federal admiralty jurisdiction, 272 the court found that the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction
was not only possible but appropriate.273 As in Maltais, the basis for the
court's finding that the jurisdictional requirements of Aldinger had been
satisfied appeared to be that admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively federal:
requirements is applicable in all situations, but that the latter two are alternative requirements. In other words, as long as the federal claim is substantial, jurisdictional power
exists over pendent claims in cases in which either the state and federal claims derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact, or in cases in which the plaintiff would be expected to
try all claims in the same lawsuit. Baker, supra, at 764-65. The third requirement is the
one that clearly establishes the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the liberal
joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Professor Baker notes that the
Gibbs Court's intent in this regard is obvious from the footnote to the third requirement,
which states in part that
[w]hile it is commonplace that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, they do embody "the whole tendency
of our decisions. . . to require a plaintiff to try his. . . whole case at one time,"
• . . and to that extent emphasize the basis of pendent jurisdiction.
383 U.S. at 725 n. 13 (citation omitted). Gibbs states, essentially, that a federal court has
the power to try an entire " 'case--a 'case' within the ordinary expectations of litigants as
measured by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"-whenever a substantial claim is present. Baker, supra, at 765.
271. 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977). The plaintiff was the consignee of a large
number of tape recorders shipped from Japan aboard the S.S. Great Peace. The plaintiff
failed to receive most of the goods due to a misdelivery to an unknown thief, and brought
an action for damages against the carrier under the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction.
In addition, the plaintiff sought to join as pendent parties a terminal operator, a customs
broker, and two trucking companies. A number of cross-claims were also filed among the
defendants. Id. at 478-81.
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976).
273. 437 F. Supp. at 485. The court implicitly acknowledged the hybrid nature of
pendent party jurisdiction by referring to the nonfederal claims as involving pendent jurisdiction and to the claims against nonfederal parties as involving ancillary jurisdiction. Id.
at 484-85.
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This Court is convinced that the prohibition set forth in Aldnger
should not and would not be extended to admiralty cases of misdelivcry. The primary claim arising out of the bill of lading is within exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction. Clearly, only in a federal court
could all of the claims be tried together. There is no indication
whatever that Congress implicitly or explicitly has determined that the
parties sought to be joined in this action should not be joined. The
Aldinger requirements for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction having
been met, the Court is free to exercise ancillary as well as pendent jurisdiction in this case.
The Court will exercise its discretion to permit both the pendent and
ancillary claims, it being in the interests of judicial economy and fairness, and in order to resolve all matters arising out of the same constitutional case for purposes of Article 111.274
Because the basis of the Owen and Aldi'nger decisions apparently was a
perceived need to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Supreme
Court addressed only the issue of jurisdictional power over nonfederal
parties. 2 75 Consequently, some lower courts apparently have treated the
Aldinger dictum as a loophole that automatically permits a finding of
Congressional approval of, or at least a lack of objection to, the use of
pendent party jurisdiction in cases in which the federal claim may be
heard only in a federal court. A finding of both constitutional power and
statutory power, in the sense that no congressional disapproval may be
inferred, is necessary before the court's discretion may be exercised.276
By viewing the Aldinger dictum as a basis for statutory power over pendent parties rather than a discretionary factor related to the Gibbs considerations of judicial economy and convenience, a court may easily
overcome both jurisdictional hurdles and then employ the Gibbs factors
as it deems appropriate-often in favor of the exercise of pendent party
jurisdiction.
A rather extreme and unusual example of a district court's broad approach to pendent party jurisdiction may be found in Wood v. Standard
Products Co.277 A fisherman employed by defendant Standard Products
Co. incurred a fish slime infection in his hand, and received treatment
from a Dr. Beatley, who was employed under a contract with the United
States Public Health Service. 278 The plaintiff's condition did not improve, and ultimately his hand and part of his forearm were amputated. 279 He sought damages from the United States as the employer of
Dr. Beatley under the Federal Tort Claims Act 280 and from the ship274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

437 F. Supp. at 485.
See notes 77-130 supra and accompanying text.
See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
456 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Id. at 1099.
(d.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
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owner under the Jones Act281 and general maritime tort law.282 In addi-

tion, he brought a pendent claim for medical malpractice against Dr.
28 3
Beatley individually.
The court stated that pendent party jurisdiction could be used to join
Dr. Beatley in the action only if the claim against him could be considered pendent to one of the three federal claims.284 It found that the
claim could not be made pendent to the Jones Act claim on the ground
that prior case law limited such actions to those against the shipowner or
the ship, even though no such limitations were imposed by the language
of the Jones Act itself.28 5 The allegation under general maritime law was

that the ship was unseaworthy because the plaintiff had not been provided with proper gloves. 28 6 The statute that confers maritime jurisdiction is worded broadly, giving the federal courts original jurisdiction over
any "civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 28 7 The court
noted, further, that pleadings in admiralty traditionally had been liberally interpreted.288 On these grounds, the court held that a claim
brought under the general maritime statute could serve as the anchor
claim for a state tort action against an additional party. 28 9 The court
acknowledged that the maritime claim was based on an allegation of
unseaworthiness, while the state tort claim against Dr. Beatley was
grounded upon medical malpractice, and that "[t]he facts relating to liability are thus disparate."2 90 Nevertheless, it found the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction to be appropriate on the following grounds:
The facts relating to damages. . . are identical. Only because of the
malpractice did the initial infection, caused by the absence of gloves,
result in harm to plaintiff for which he here seeks compensation. Thus
judicial economy and efficiency are served by the exercise of pendant
29 1
[sic] party jurisdiction here.
The court found that the claim against Dr. Beatley could be made
281. 46 U.S.C. § 668 (1976).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
283. 456 F. Supp. at 1099.
284. Id. at 1100.
285. Id. The court stated that "[tihis limitation ... is at least as explicit as the supposed congressional limitation in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against counties recognized in
Aldinger yet abandoned two (2) years later in Monell v.Dept. of Social Services of Ciy of New
York." Id. (citation omitted).
286. Id.
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) provides that "[tjhe district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id.
288. 456 F. Supp. at 1103 (citing Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800
(2d Cir. 1971)).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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292
basing its decision on
pendent to the Federal Tort Claims Act as well,
29 3
the language of the Act, 294 and prior decisions
the Aldinger dictum,

295
favoring the exercise of jurisdiction in Federal Tort Claims Act cases.
Having determined that jurisdiction over the malpractice claim
against Dr. Beatley was possible, the court went on to decide that the
exercise of its jurisdiction was appropriate. 296 The court's reasoning,
however, appears to have been based on a thoroughly confused reading
of Gibbs. The court seemed to say that because all claims in the case
supposedly arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, its discretion
should be exercised in favor of assuming jurisdiction over the claim

against the pendent party. 29 7 Gibbs, however, states quite explicitly that

the presence of state and federal claims deriving from a common nucleus
298
of operative fact is the test for constitutional power.
The court was justified in finding the Federal Tort Claims Act to have
been an approprite anchor for the malpractice claim against Dr. Beatley,
since Dr. Beatley was said to have been the United States' agent, and
both the claim against the United States and that asserted against the
doctor were based on the doctor's alleged malpractice.299 With respect
to the maritime claim upon the ship's alleged unseaworthiness, however,
the court addressed the Aldinger issue of statutory power without first
considering whether constitutional power, as defined in Gibbs, was present. The court noted that "only by allowing pendant [sic] party jurisdiction can all claims arising out of Dr. Beatley's alleged negligence in the
3 00
treatment of the plaintiff be tried in one forum."
The maritime claim based on the ship's unseaworthiness, however, did
not arise out of the doctor's negligence, which occurred well after the
plaintiff's initial injury. In its discussion of discretion, the court stated
that "[w]hether Dr. Beatley was negligent is the operative factor in the
Federal Tort Claims Act claim and it is central to the general maritime
and Jones Act claims."301 The court clearly considered the unseaworthiness claim and the malpractice claim to have arisen from a common nucleus of operative fact, yet it did not discuss this threshold issue, which is
essential to a finding of constitutional power,3 0 2 in conjunction with its
292. Id. at 1104.
293. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
294. 456 F. Supp. at 1104. The language upon which the court relied was the provision stating that "[t]he United States shall be liable ... to the same extent as a private
individual under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
295. 456 F. Supp. at 1104.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 1103.
298. 383 U.S. at 725.
299. See id.; notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
300. 456 F. Supp. at 1103.
301. Id. at 1104.
302. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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jurisdictional power finding. To say that those two claims arose from a
common nucleus of operative fact is, in any event, to give that term an
extraordinarily generous interpretation. 30 3 Even granting that the statute conferring general maritime jurisdiction upon the federal courts
might not impliedly preclude jurisdiction over state claims against additional parties, the Wood court, by assuming the existence of jurisdictional
power, appears to have made a leap of faith that is difficult to justify
after a careful reading of Gibbs and Aldtnger.
In cases in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive, it is apparent that
the district courts will not often hesitate to exercise pendent party jurisdiction. 304 The wide range of justifications presented indicates a need for
303. A common nucleus of operative fact has been found to exist in many cases in
which the connection between the anchor claim and the pendent claim has been somewhat tenuous. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, .upra note 1, § 3567, at 445 & n.28. In cases in
which the claims are found to be completely independent, however, the court has no
power to hear the pendent claim. Id. at 446-47 & n.29.
Merely because both the state and federal claims arose from the same event does not
necessarily mean that they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. If the claims
involve different theories of recovery and elements of proof, the relationship between the
claims may well be insufficient to confer jurisdictional power over the state law claim. See
Wilder v. Irvin, 423 F. Supp. 639, 642-43 (N.D. Ga. 1976). In Wilder, a farmer was ejected
without a hearing from a state-run farmer's market for violating certain rules. He nevertheless returned to the market to sell produce and was arrested on charges of criminal
trespass. He brought an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976),
alleging that his civil rights had been violated as a result of his having been evicted from
the market without a hearing. In addition, he alleged causes of action under two Georgia
statutes for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment arising from his arrest for tres-,
pass. The court held that it had no jurisdiction over the pendent state claims because they
did not share a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal civil rights claims:
A trial on the state claim would inject new issues and a large amount of facts
unrelated to the other portion of the case involving the federal claim. The state
claim will certainly not be proven by the evidence that will be offered on behalf
of the federal claim. The subject matter of the state and federal claims are not
closely enough related and the Court finds that a "common nucleus of operative
facts" does not exist.
Id. at 643. The same could be said with respect to the maritime and malpractice claims
asserted in Wood. The elements of proof and theories of recovery involved in the unseaworthiness claim obviously were different from and unrelated to those of the medical malpractice claim, even though both arose as a result of the plaintiff's having incurred a fish
slime infection.
304. Occasionally, however, a court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction even though
it finds that both constitutional and statutory power may be present. Crabtree Invs., Inc.
v. Aztec Enterprises, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 211 (M.D. La. 1980), involved an action brought
under the Securities and Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, over which the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Nevertheless, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim brought by (rather than against) a party over whom
the court had no independent jurisdiction. 483 F. Supp. at 218. The court found:
Most likely, Congress did not intend to deny or to allow parties with state law
claims closely related to a lOb-5 action to assert them in federal court which has
exclusive jurisdiction over lOb-5 claims. While Congress did not expressly or
impliedly deny pendent or pendent party jurisdiction in lOb-5 cases, this is not
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clear standards, however. 30 5 In many of these cases, the Aldinger dictum
is used as a basis for establishing statutory jurisdictional power, even
though it is more logical to view it as a Gibbs-type discretionary factor.306
This is because no express finding of congressional approval is necessary
for statutory power to exist. Under Ald'nger and Owen, the federal courts
lack statutory power only when Congress has indicated that jurisdiction
over nonfederal parties would be inappropriate. Consequently the courts
are free to exercise their discretion at the point at which a determination
is made that Congress has not in some manner limited their jurisdiction.
Moreover, despite the apparently stringent power requirement of Adinger, the courts, as a practical matter, may have considerable leeway in
determining whether statutory power is present. 30 7 In those cases in
essential to this decision because after considering the discretionary factors listed
above, the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction would be inappropriate.
Id. at 218 (emphasis in original). The court took into consideration six factors: judicial
economy, fairness to the litigants, convenience to the parties and witnesses, whether the
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claim, whether unsettled questions of state law were present, and whether the combination of claims would unduly
complicate the case for the jury. Id. at 217. The court considered the most important
factor under the circumstances of this case to be the fact that the party seeking to be
joined had already filed several actions in state court, one of which already had been
brought to judgment. Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness thus
dictated that the pendent party claims be dismissed. Id. at 218.
305. Some courts have accurately applied the Aldinger and Gibbs standards and nevertheless have been able to justify the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction without confusing the concepts of power and discretion. For example, in Southeastern Lumber Mfrs.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Walthour Agency, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ga. 1980), in which the
trustees of an employee benefit plan brought an action against certain other fiduciaries
under ERISA and attempted to assert a state law claim against an accounting firm for
accounting malpractice, the court correctly analyzed the requirements of both Gibbs and
Aldnger. First, it found that it had constitutional power over the entire case because all
claims arose from a common nucleus of operative fact such that the plaintiff would be
expected to try them together. Id. at 783-84. Second, it determined that the statute conferring federal jurisdiction over ERISA claims, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976), did "not contemplate that the parties sought to be made pendent should be excluded." 486 F. Supp. at
784 (emphasis in original). Because jurisdiction over most types of ERISA cases is exclusively federal, and because it is granted "without respect to the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties," 29 U.S.C. § 1132() (1976), the court interpreted the statute
"as indicating the intent of Congress that federal courts develop the law surrounding ERISA plans and that the federal forum be the exclusive one for redress of violations of
ERISA." 486 F. Supp. at 784. Finally, the court citing the Aldinger dictum, decided that
its discretion should be exercised in favor of asserting jurisdiction over the pendent parties.
The court listed as factors in its decision the Gibbs considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness, the lack of an alternative forum in which the entire case could
be heard, and the possibility of inconsistent judgments if the different issues were tried
separately. Id. The court's discussion is simple and direct, and may provide a good model
for an analysis in cases in which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the
anchor claim.
306. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
307. Note, Pendent PartyJurisdiction. The Demise of a Doctrine?, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 361,
365-66 (1978); see, e.g., Dick Myers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th
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which the statute conferring jurisdiction is silent about claims against
additional parties and there exists no relevant legislative history or judicial interpretations, the courts often use the Aldinger dictum as the missing justification, even though no express justification seems to be
necessary.
2.

Pendent Party Jurisdictionin Diversity Cases

In pendent party cases that arise under the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction, the discretion of the district courts concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction may have been virtually eliminated 30 8 by the Supreme
Court's decision in Owen.309 The Court emphasized that the rule of complete diversity established in Strawbridgev. Curt'ss3lO would continue to be
strictly construed. 3 11 As a result, under no circumstances, despite a
demonstrated need for judicial economy or convenience, may a plaintiff
circumvent the requirement of complete diversity by using ancillary jurisdiction to sue directly a nondiverse party impleaded by the original
3 2
defendant. 1
Although the Owen decision follows Aldnger in requiring a consideration of the congressional intent underlying the statute conferring jurisdicCir. 1978). The plaintiff operated tugboats on a river near a lock and dam. The lock
failed and was closed to river traffic for several months; as a result, plaintiff's business was
harmed. Plaintiff brought an action against the United States for negligent maintenance
and operation of the lock, and sought to join as a pendent party the builder, claiming that
the lock had been negligently constructed. Jurisdiction over the claim against the United
States was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). The court, without discussing the Aldinger
requirements at all, asserted jurisdiction over the builder, noting that jurisdiction also
could have been based upon the court's admiralty jurisdiction. I. at 1024 n. 1.
308. See Comment, supra note 62, at 947.
309. Owen Equip. and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
310. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
311. 437 U.S. at 377.
312. See id. The Owen Court based its decision in part on the fact that section 1332 had
been reenacted shortly after the amendment of Rule 14. At that time, the Advisory Committee commented that the majority rule regarding the application of Rule 14 was that a
plaintiff could not amend his complaint to assert a claim against an impleaded third
party. The Court considered the subsequent reenactment of section 1332 without a corresponding change to constitute congressional approval of that view. See 437 U.S. at 374
n.16. Professor Garvey, however, takes a dim view of the Court's rationale. See Garvey,
supra note 10, at 715-23. He points out that there was little legislative history surrounding
the reenactment, and comments that "this paucity of legislative history suggests that it is
fanciful to infer from the fact of reenactment in code form that Congress meant to adopt
one position or another on any matter that was at all in dispute." Id. at 717.
It is interesting to note that although in Owen the Court strictly limited pendent party
jurisdiction in diversity cases on the ground that Congress had intended section 1332 to be
construed narrowly, in Ald'nger it cited with approval the Ninth Circuit's comment that
"diversity cases generally present more attractive opportunities for exercising pendentparty jurisdiction [than federal question cases], since all claims therein by definition arise
from state law." 427 U.S. at 5-6.
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tion,313 it differs from Aldinger in its omission of the element of discretion
from its jurisdictional test. 3 14 Under Aldinger, pendent party jurisdiction
may be exercised if three factors are present: constitutional power, statutory power, and considerations favoring the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction.3 15 According to Owen, on the other hand, if jurisdiction is
predicated on diversity of citizenship,316 the only issues are whether constitutional power exists and whether the diversity statute places limitations on that power. 31 7 Because the diversity statute always has been
interpreted narrowly,318 the analysis ends once the presence of a nondi3
verse pendent party has been established. 19
Diversity jurisdiction, in fact, is one of the few forms of federal jurisdiction in which the joinder of parties, as opposed to claims, has been specifically limited. 320 In most statutes that confer federal question
jurisdiction, Congress has expressed no particular intent either to favor
or to restrict the joinder of pendent parties.321

When no such intent is

apparent, the district courts may interpret the statute in any way that
might reasonably justify a decision to accept or deny jurisdiction.322 No
such flexibility appears to be present in diversity cases.
In accordance with Owen, the lower federal courts generally have continued to reject any broadening of diversity jurisdiction that might result
from the application of the pendent party doctrine.323 The Owen decision has made it apparent that the Supreme Court will not permit diversity jurisdiction to be expanded beyond its present limits.324
a.

Extension of Owen to Other Ancillaq Claims

If the results of the Owen decision are limited to those unusual situa313. See 437 U.S. at 373.
314. See id. at 377.
315. See 427 U.S. at 18; Comment, supra note 62, at 951.
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
317. See 437 U.S. at 373; Comment, supra note 62, at 951.
318. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at § 24.
319. See Comment, supra note 62, at 951.
320. See Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiaion." Positive Side Efficts and PotentialforFurther
Refrmts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963, 993-94 (1979). Recently, Congress has considered abolishing diversity jurisdiction altogether. See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1(b) (1978).
Numerous arguments have been presented in favor of this proposal, one of which is that it
will remove some of the substantial confusion surrounding pendent party jurisdiction. See
Rowe, supra, at 993. If diversity jurisdiction is abolished Owen-type cases will no longer
occur, and pendent party jurisdiction will remain an issue only in federal question cases.
321. See notes 304-07 supra and accompanying text.
322. See note 307 supra and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979); Gallo
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 488 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Stanhope v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 483 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Ark. 1980); Skinner v. American Oil Co., 470 F. Supp.
229 (S.D. Iowa 1979); Penn State Constr. Co. v. Associated-East Mortgage Co., 457 F.
Supp. 316 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
324. See Comment, supra note 62, at 960.
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tions in which a plaintiff who originally chose the federal forum attempts
to bring an action directly against a party properly impleaded by the
original defendant, the impact of the case may be relatively insignificant.
If, however, the Strawbridge rule as strictly interpreted by the Owen Court
is applied beyond the facts of Owen to other types of ancillary claims in
general, the effect could be to abrogate to a substantial degree the liberal
joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 25 The Owen
Court pointed out in dictum, however, that "in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or
effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit." Those practi3 2
cal needs are the basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 6 It is
therefore unlikely that the Court would deliberately place further restrictions on joinder under the Federal Rules. 327 Nevertheless, the limitations
on ancillary jurisdiction imposed by Owen have been interpreted by some
of the lower federal courts in situations unrelated to the highly unusual
factual circumstances of that case.
Owen has been applied, for example, in cases in which a plaintiff has
sought to join one or more nondiverse parties in an action in which there
is at least one diverse defendant.3 28 Even prior to Owen, the long-standing requirement of complete diversity had prohibited the direct joinder
of nondiverse defendants in the context of ordinary ancillary jurisdiction.3 29 Although some plaintiffs have attempted to use the pendent
party theory in an attempt to circumvent the diversity requirement,330 it
is now apparent that the joinder of nondiverse defendants as pendent
33 1
parties will not be permitted.
The result has been the same even in cases in which the attempted
joinder of a nondiverse party has occurred after removal by a defendant
from state to federal court.33 2 Owen has been used as a justification for
prohibiting joinder under such circumstancesa 33 despite the significance
the Owen Court placed on the plaintiff's choice of the federal forum in
that case. 334 If, instead, it is the defendant who by removing the case has
325. See id. at 959.
326. 437 U.S. at 377.
327. See Currie, supra note 10, at 766.
328. See, e.g., Gallo v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 488 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Stanhope v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 483 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Ark. 1980); Straub v. DESA
Indus., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 791 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Skinner v. American Oil Co., 470 F. Supp.
229 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
329. See C. WRIGHT, .fupra note 17, §§ 24, 71.
330. Se generally notes 308-22 supra and accompanying text.
331. See 437 U.S. at 377.
332. See, e.g., Stanhope v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 483 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Ark.
1980); Skinner v. American Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
333. See cases cited note 332 supra.
334. See 437 U.S. at 376.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

43

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

chosen to litigate it in federal court, arguably Owen is less persuasive authority for precluding the treatment of nondiverse defendants as pendent
parties. One writer, in criticizing Owen, has suggested that a logical extension of Owen might result in the prohibition of any use of ancillary
jurisdiction over claims brought by a defendant who removes the case to
335
federal court.
Owen is not necessary, however, as a basis for prohibiting the direct
joinder of nondiverse parties, since this procedure was already prohibited
by the Strawbr'dge rule; claims against such parties have never been considered ancillary.336 Owen merely emphasizes that the complete diversity
requirement will be strictly enforced.
b.

Extension of Owen to Permissive and Compulsoy Counterclaims

Owen also has been cited as authority in cases involving permissive and
compulsory counterclaims. In US General, Inc. v. City of Joliet,337 the
court discussed at length a pleading, which it characterized as a "legal
bouillabaisse," 338 that the defendants had filed against the plaintiffs and
certain additional parties.339 After sorting out the allegations, the trial
court determined that it should be considered a permissive counterclaim. 34° Because it alleged state law claims based on malicious prosecution or abuse of process, while the original claim arose from the
defendant's alleged failure to issue certain building permits, the counterclaim could not be considered compulsory.341 The additional defendants
named in the counterclaim were nondiverse. Since a permissive counterclaim must be based upon independent jurisdictional grounds, the de342
fendant's counterclaim was dismissed.
The court apparently considered these reasons insufficient, however,
since it went on to comment that even if the counterclaim could have
been considered compulsory, application of the principles of Owen and
Aldnger would have led to its dismissal. 34 3 This statement could perhaps
be considered either a misinterpretation of, or an overreaction to, the
rules that those cases set forth. First, additional parties unquestionably
may be brought into an action under Rule 13(h)344 to respond to a coun335. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 708, 710-11.
336. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 24, at 95-96.
337. 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979).
338. Id. at 1051.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1053.
341. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) defines a compulsory counter-claim as one that "arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction."
342. 598 F.2d at 1054.
343. See id at 1054-55.
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terclaim if their joinder is appropriate under Rules 19 or 20.345 Such
parties will automatically come within the court's ancillary jurisdiction
as long as the counterclaim is compulsory.3 46 Had the defendant's counterclaim in US General satisfied the compulsory counterclaim requirements of Rule 13(a), the defendant could have joined the additional
parties to respond to the counterclaim.347 The Owen Court specifically
distinguished the situation before it from those cases involving impleader, cross-claims, or counterclaims3 48 Noting that the context of
Owen's claim was "quite different from the kinds of nonfederal claims
that have been viewed in other cases as falling within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts,"3 49 the Court pointed out that the claim
asserted by Owen was "simply not ancillary."So Parties properly joined
under Rules 13(a) and (h) are considered to be within the court's ancillary jurisdiction;3 5 1 however, Owen, should not be read as authority for
the proposition that ancillary jurisdiction may no longer be exercised
with respect to counterclaims asserted against nondiverse parties prop35 2
erly joined under the Federal Rules.

The US General court, citing Gibbs, appeared to consider the exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction under the Federal Rules to be discretionary in
the same fashion as the assertion of pendent jurisdiction is considered to
be discretionary according to Gibbs.353 Ancillary jurisdiction, however,
as it is applied under the Rules, has not been subject to the same discretionary considerations as has pendent jurisdiction.354 If the US General
court intended to say that under Owen and Gibbs the district courts have
the discretion to deny ancillary jurisdiction in connection with parties
properly joined to respond to a compulsory counterclaim, it was simply
3 55
incorrect.
c.

Pendent ParyJurisdiction in Diversitv Cases After Owen

A few courts have favored the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction in
diversity cases after Owen. Even in those cases, however, the courts acnal action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the
provisions of Rules 19 and 20."
345. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 79, at 395. Joinder under Rule 13(h) involves a
more remote connection than other forms of ancillary jurisdiction, but nevertheless continues to be considered permissible, even though it probably is at least as tenuously connected to the main claim as the pendent party was in Owen.
346. See id
347. See id
348. 437 U.S. at 375-76.
349. Id. at 376.
350. Id.
351. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 79, at 394.
352. See 437 U.S. at 377.
353. 598 F.2d at 1054.
354. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
355. See id
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knowledged that the complete diversity requirement could not be
avoided through the use of this theory. In United Paci# Insurance Co. v.
CapitalDevelopment Board,356 the plaintiff, a Washington corporation engaged in selling performance bonds, brought a declaratory judgment action against an Illinois state agency and a contractor, an Illinois
corporation, to determine whether certain performance bonds, which the
plaintiff refused to honor, had been forged.3 57 Because the state agency
was determined to be an alter ego of the state, 358 the court had no independent jurisdiction over the agency, since a state is not a "citizen" for
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.3 59 The agency was deemed to be
an indispensable party under Rule 19,360 however. The agency contended that since joinder was required but would result in the destruction of complete diversity, the entire action should be dismissed.361
Nevertheless, the court permitted joinder of the agency for the rather
obvious reason that because the state agency was not a citizen, it could
not be a cocitizen of the plaintiff; thus the complete diversity requirement would not be defeated by the joinder of the agency.3 6 2 The reason

for the court's lengthy discussion of pendent party jurisdiction is not apparent. Although the court stated that the agency could not be joined as
a pendent party, 363 in fact there was no reason for the court to discuss the

pendent party theory at all; the case involved nothing more than the
joinder of parties under Rule 19. Nevertheless, the court's remarks are
interesting in that they seem to demonstrate an inclination to read Owen
and Zahn v. International Paper Co.364 very narrowly. The court
commented:
The Zahn and Kroger [Owen] decisions cannot be read so broadly as to
throw a blanket prohibition over the use of pendent party jurisdiction
in diversity cases. Rather, we believe that those cases stand for the
more limited rule that pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction should
not be used to defeat the amount in controversy and complete diversity
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.365
In Ayer v. GeneralDynamics Corp. ,366 the court gave Owen a similar interpretation. A bank, the holder of mortgage on an airplane, brought an
action in a New York state court against the guarantor, Ayer, to enforce
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

482 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 542.
Id.; see Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482 (1894).
482 F. Supp. at 544; see FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
482 F. Supp. at 544.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
482 F. Supp. at 546.
82 F.R.D. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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his personal guarantee.3 6 7 Ayer impleaded the manufacturer of the airplane, seeking indemnity; the manufacturer counterclaimed and removed that action to federal court. 36 The bank's action against Ayer
was later dismissed,3 69 and the third-party action was severed and continued.370 Ayer attempted to join as plaintiffs in the idemnity action two
Peruvian corporations that he controlled.3 71 Ayer also controlled a third
corporation, whose principal place of business was New York. The manufacturer moved for dismissal of the third-party complaint on the ground
that the corporations were indispensable parties.3

72

Since the New York

corporation and the bank, the original plaintiff, were citizens of the same
state, the question was raised whether the third-party claim was ancillary
to the bank's original claim against Ayer.3

73

The Magistrate found that

no independent jurisdictional ground was necessary because Ayer's claim
against the manufacturer was for indemnification; the claim was thus
ancillary3 74 Furthermore, the Magistrate determined that the theory of
ancillary jurisdiction was "flexible enough" 375 to permit the New York
corporation to be joined on a separate count.
The district court noted that the joinder of the New York corporation
would have destroyed complete diversity, but that there was complete
diversity as between the manufacturer and the third-party plaintiffs if
the severed actions were considered separately; thus joinder of the New
York corporation would be permissible.3 76 Although this determination
apparently was sufficient to resolve the issue, the court went on to cite
the statement in Owen that "Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of the federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect
legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit"'

77

as support for its conclusion that ancillary jurisdiction would

have been proper even if the actions had not been severed.3 78 Although
the court never referred to the New York corporation as a pendent party,
it is apparent that the pendent party theory was the basis for this statement. The court stated that certain "equitable considerations"3 79 distinguished the case before it from Owen. These considerations were that in
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.

Id.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 121; see Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); FED. R. Civ. P. 14; 3 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.26, at 14-532 (2d ed. 1974).
375. 82 F.R.D. at 121.
376. Se id
377. 437 U.S. at 373.
378. See 82 F.R.D. at 121.
379. Id.
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Ayer it was the party seeking dismissal that chose the federal forum, 3 80
and the determination that the claim for indemnity was unquestionably
ancillary. 38 ' Most interestingly, the court commented that it found itself
"constrained to exercise whatever discretion it has to permit joinder of
[the New York corporation] so that this 'entire, logically entwined lawsuit' may proceed, and '[i]n view of the ease with which disposition of all
claims can be made herein in this one action.' "382 The court evidently
had concluded that a certain amount of discretion over ancillary claims
is possible. Although the court cited Owen in support of its position, Owen
also says that "neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of
judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiffs cause of action against a citizen of the
same State in a diversity case." 3 83 Owen clearly permits no such discretion over ancillary claims insofar as its exercise could defeat the requirement of complete diversity. The Ayer court therefore would have been
incorrect in permitting the discretionary joinder of the New York corporation had the third-party action not been severed from the main claim.
3. Pendent Parties and the Amount in Controvers Requirement
Pendent party jurisdiction also has been used unsuccessfully as a
means of attempting to avoid the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of section 1332(b).314 The Supreme Court held in Zahn v. International PaperCo. 38 5 that in a class action, those members of the class whose
claims amount to less than $10,000 may not aggregate those claims to
reach the statutory requirement.3 8 6 The majority opinion did not address the issue of whether the parties whose claims could not be aggregated could nevertheless be brought into the action on a theory of
ancillary jurisdiction. Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent that the
use of ancillary jurisdiction in class actions brought under Rule 23(b) (3)
would be no less appropriate than its application to compulsory counter38 7
claims, intervention, cross-claims, or impleader.
Zahn has been described as "puzzling" 388 because it did not consider
the ancillary jurisdiction question, even though ancillary jurisdiction had
been used to avoid the amount in controversy requirement in other situations. 38 9 Nevertheless, the fact that certain cases upon which the Court
relied in Zahn did not involve class actions leads to the conclusion that
See id at 122.
Setid
Id.
437 U.S. at 377.
Set 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1976).
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
388. C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 36, at 142.
389. See 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, siupra note 1, § 3704, at 426-27 & n.47.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
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the Court did not intend to limit the rule established in Zahn only to class
actions.390 Subsequent decisions in nonclass action cases have not only
followed Zahn, but have relied upon Owen to prohibit the circumvention
of the amount in controversy requirement391 by means of pendent party
jurisdiction.3 92 Two recent cases may be used as examples of this
approach.
In National Insurance Underwritersv. Piper Aircraft Corp.,393 the plaintiff,
which had issued insurance on an airplane, sought to recover payment as
subrogee of the insured from the airplane's manufacturer. 39 4 The insured hired an attorney to represent it in an action against the manufacturer based on the malfunction and resulting destruction of the plane. 395
The plaintiff then agreed to release its subrogation rights to the insured
for $7,000. The insured, in turn, agreed to settle with the manufacturer
for about $12,000. An agent of the insured gave a check for $7,000, payable to the plaintiff, to the attorney, to whom the manufacturer's insurance company also gave a settlement check. The attorney gave the latter
check to the insured, which soon filed for bankruptcy, but the plaintiff
never received the $7,000 check.396
The plaintiff brought a diversity action in which it alleged several alternative claims.397 It sought, among other relief, $11,000, the amount it
had originally paid its insured, from the manufacturer; $7,000 from the
manufacturer's insurer, or $7,000 from the attorney. 398 The defendants
contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
$7,000 claim because it did not meet the amount in controversy requirement of section 1332(b).399 The plaintiff, however, argued that pendent
party jurisdiction gave the court the power to hear the claims against the
insurance company and the attorney.400 The court applied the Owen
analysis and concluded that pendent party jurisdiction was inappropriate, stating that "[j]ust as congressional intent would be circumvented by
allowing a plaintiff to bring suit against a nondiverse impleaded defendant, the intent is circumvented by allowing a plaintiff to bring one diversity claim in excess of the minimum amount and join several other
390. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 36, at 142.
391. The amount in controversy requirement now applies only in cases arising under
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. The requirement was recently abolished for federal question cases. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
392. See notes 393-409 infra and accompanying text.
393. 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979).
394. Id. at 547.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 547-48.
400. Id.
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defendants by asserting $7,000 claims."40
In Aco FinancialServices v. Treasure Island Motor Inn, Inc.,402 claims for
rent due on leased air conditioning equipment were asserted against six
defendants.403 Although complete diversity existed between the plaintiff
and the defendants, the claim against one of the defendants was for only
$8,9 18. 404 The plaintiff argued that the Gibbs tests for pendent jurisdiction could be used to include the claim against the sixth defendant in the
action against the other five. 0 5 As in NationalInsurance Undewno'ters, however, the court concluded, without much analysis, that Aldinger, Owen,
and Zahn required the dismissal of that claim because it failed to satisfy
independently the amount in controversy requirement.406
This conclusion seems to be consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Owen that even considerations of judicial economy and convenience could not overcome the Strawbridge rule and permit the extension of
ancillary jurisdiction to a claim against a nondiverse pendent party. 40 7
Interpretations of section 1332(b), however, do not provide quite as
strong authority for the extremely narrow reading of that provision4O8 as
does the consistently restrictive judicial interpretation placed upon the
complete diversity requirement. Under limited circumstances, aggregation has been permitted, as in cases in which a single plaintiff has two or
more claims against a single defendant, or in which several plaintiffs assert claims regarding a common and undivided interest.409 Even after
Zahn, a few courts, distinguishing the Zahn situation, have permitted the
aggregation of claims.410 Aldinger and Owen, however, obviously have
provided additional ammunition for opponents of aggregation: a party
who is sued on a claim for less than ten thousand dollars and over whom
there is no other basis for federal jurisdiction may be regarded as a pendent party; if so, the Aldinger requirement of statutory power must be
met.
In cases in which complete diversity is an issue, the continued acceptance of the Strawbridge rule makes a finding of legislative intent to limit
diversity relatively simple. The legislative intent behind the aggregation
rules is not clear, however, and despite the apparently definitive holding
of Zahn, the law is in fact so unsettled that perhaps Zahn should not pre401. Id. at 550.
402. 82 F.R.D. 735 (N.D. II1. 1979).
403. Id. at 736. The "pendent" party allegedly was the principal of one of the diverse
defendants. Id. at 736 n.2.
404. Id. at 736.
405. Id. at 737.
406. Id.
407. See 437 U.S. at 377.
408. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 36.
409. See id § 36, at 139.
410. See, e.g., Afton Alps, Inc. v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 543, 546 n.2 (D. Minn.
1974); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83, 88-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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clude the use of pendent party jurisdiction as a device for the aggregation
of claims.411

In cases involving aggregation, as in those based upon diversity, the
element ofjudicial discretion apparently does not enter into the consideration of whether a pendent party may be brought into a lawsuit. If
courts continue consistently to interpret Zahn as precluding aggregation
in the same manner as Owen is said to preclude avoidance of the Strawbridge rule, the Gibbs discretionary factors will be entirely irrelevant to
the issue of pendent party jurisdiction in such cases.
V.

SUGGESTED STANDARDS

A.

Pendent Junsdiction

The Gibbs decision led to a liberal approach to pendent jurisdiction by
most of the lower federal courts. Once a party had established that the
state law claim arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a
substantial federal claim, the courts became relatively free to decide
whether they should exercise their jurisdiction. Although Gibbs lists a
2
number of factors that courts should consider in making this decision,41
inconsistency in the application of these factors has resulted in a lack of
predictability in many situations. It is safe to say that in most cases in
which constitutional power is found to exist, courts will exercise their
discretion in favor of hearing pendent claims. Because those matters
committed to the discretion of a trial court are seldom questioned on
appeal, it is important at the outset to be able to establish a basis for
predicting which factors a court may rely upon, and the manner in
which those factors may be applied. This is difficult, of course, because
of the subjective aspects of any such decisions, but the following general
guidelines are suggested.
Both the language of Gibbs413 and the historical development of the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine414 make it apparent that in most cases, the
question of whether jurisdiction should be exercised should be resolved in
favor of the federal court hearing the claim. The factors listed in Gibbs
that favor the dismissal of such claims should be viewed as exceptions to
the general rule that federal courts may properly adjudicate state law
claims that are sufficiently related to substantial federal questions. Only
when considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness are
insufficient to overcome such factors as the need to avoid federal decisions of unsettled state law questions or the possibility of jury confusion
should a court decline to hear a pendent claim.
In Gibbs, the Court stated that a federal court should avoid unneces411. Se C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 36, at 142.
412. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.

413. See 383 U.S. at 726-27.
414. See notes 138-220 supra and accompanying text.
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sary decisions of state law,415 and that this might be the most important

reason for declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction.416 This consideration also seems to be the source of some confusion, because it is related to
the abstention doctrines by the underlying factors of comity and federalism. Some distinctions may be drawn, however. It is important to note
that the abstention doctrines, while discretioriary, are usually applied
only in those unusual circumstances in which a resolution of an unsettled
state law question would make a federal constitutional decision unnecessary,4 17 or when a pervasive state regulatory scheme is present. 4 15 Furthermore, considerable doubt remains whether abstention is approprite
at all, if the only reason for it would be to avoid a decision relating to a
difficult or unsettled state law question.419 Pendent jurisdiction, in contrast, involves the decision by a federal court of a state law question arising in conjunction with a federal claim. If an unsettled question of state
law appears in connection with a pendent claim, Gibbs says that it may,
0
or even should, be dismissed.42
The argument thus may be made that the broad discretion given the
federal courts by Gibbs permits a court to dismiss a pendent claim in
circumstances under which abstention might be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the notion that a court has the discretion to dismiss a pendent
claim for no other reason than it is based on an undecided state law
claim is inconsistent with the established rule that the presence of such a
question is usually an insufficient basis for a court's decision to abstain
from hearing a claim.421 Many of the post-Meredith abstention cases provide strong authority for the proposition that a court's discretion does not
extend so far as to permit the dismissal of a state law claim merely because it is unsettled.422 Gibbs should be read as meaning that only when
countervailing factors are weak or absent should the presence of an unsettled state law question lead to dismissal of a claim, just as abstention is
usually inappropriate absent a federal constitutional question or pervasive state regulation.
The problem of inconsistent results that could arise from the separate
trials of state and federal claims is an important consideration that favors
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. 42 3 Whenever the circumstances are
such that the state court trial of the dismissed claim could lead to substantially different results from those of the trial on the related federal
415. See 383 U.S. at 726.
416. See id at 726 n.15.
417. See notes 152-84 supra and accompanying text.
418. See id

419. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); C. WRIGHT, supra
note 17, § 52, at 225.
420. 383 U.S. at 726-27.
421. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
422. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 52, at 225-26.
423. See notes 185-99 supra and accompanying text.
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claim, it will be necessary to consider to what extent principles of collateral estoppel might prevent relitigation of the same issues.424 The effects

of collateral estoppel might differ, however, according to whether the
state or federal trial was held first; therefore the possible preclusive effects
of collateral estopel should not be relied upon to solve the inconsistency
problem.425
In cases in which the dismissal of the state claim is likely to produce
either inconsistent results or duplicative trials, any argument in favor of
the federal court's retaining jurisdiction over the claim must be based
upon the Gibbs Court's clearly-expressed concern for fairness to litigants
and judicial economy. The expense and inconvenience of two trials on
similar issues often will be an unreasonable burden to impose upon a
party; 426 the duplication of judicial resources may be difficult to justify

absent other considerations. Unless the party urging dismissal of the
claim is able to present compelling arguments based on considerations
sufficient to counter the need for judicial economy and fairness to litigants, the court generally should hear the pendent claim.
A factor that weighs against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is the
dismissal of the federal anchor claim before trial.427 The Gibbs Court

strongly recommended that under such circumstances the pendent claim
also should be dismissed, 428 but dismissal cannot be said to be
mandatory. 429 Nevertheless, it appears that most courts will dismiss
these pendent claims routinely, unless to do so would result in some substantial hardship to the plaintiff.430 If, for example, the plaintiff had no
state forum available in which the state claim could be tried as where a
state statute of limitations had run during the pendency of the federal
proceedings, a court may be hesitant to dismiss the claim. The argument
based on judicial economy, however, is no longer relevant when there
will be no federal trial; similarly, no problem with inconsistent verdicts
can arise. Fairness to litigants is likely to be a persuasive consideration
only when dismissal of the pendent claim will deprive the plaintiff of a
forum in which it can be heard. Thus the recommendation in Gibbs,
while not a directive, appears to be a recognition that many of the considerations that would otherwise favor federal adjudication of a state law
claim are not likely to be present if the anchor claim is dismissed before
trial.
The decision of a court to hear a pendent claim, therefore, is based
upon a balancing of the factors listed in Gibbs and discussed above. The
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See id
See id
See Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Adams, 83 F.R.D. 398, 405 (D. Mass. 1979).
See notes 200-20 supra and accompanying text.
383 U.S. at 726.
See notes 207-09 supra and accompanying text.
See id
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factors are not weighted equally, however, and Gibbs does not provide a
complete guide to their application. The general trend, which is consistent with the language of Gibbs, continues toward the liberal exercise of
pendent jurisdiction. The factors that weigh most heavily in favor of
jurisdiction over pendent claims seem to be the need to avoid excessive,
duplicative, or inconsistent litigation, and the policy of ensuring that a
party is not deprived of some forum in which his claims may be heard.
Against these considerations may be balanced the presence of unsettled
state law questions and the dismissal of the federal claim before trial,
neither of which should be regarded as determinative.
B. Pendent PartyJunsdiction
The limits of pendent party jurisdiction are not yet apparent. The
Aldinger Court did not actually prohibit its use, yet indicated that its
application may be narrower than that of pendent jurisdiction.43i The
new limitation that Ald'nger specifically imposed is one of jurisdictional
power: unless constitutional power as defined by Gibbs is present and
express or implied prohibition by Congress of the exercise of jurisdiction
over additional parties is absent, the court has no power to hear claims
brought by or against pendent parties. Only after jurisdictional power is
established does the matter of discretion become significant. The distinction between the issues of power and discretion, however, have become
blurred in many post-Aldinger cases. Some lower federal courts, recognizing that the statutory power requirement could restrict the use of pendent party jurisdiction, seem to have treated findings of statutory power
as discretionary matters, particularly in those cases in which neither the
approval nor the disapproval of Congress is apparent in either the statute
conferring jurisdiction or its history. 432 In some cases, the courts have
used the Gibbs factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants as the basis for a finding of statutory jurisdictional power. As a
result, the application of pendent party jurisdiction in these cases actually appears to be broader than it was before Aldinger.
This approach, however, is probably incorrect.because it fails to recognize that the finding of jurisdictional power is simply not a discretionary
matter. It is essential to avoid confusion of the power and discretion
issues; this confusion has resulted in a broadening, in some cases, of the
pendent party doctrine to an extent considerably beyond that which the
Supreme Court intended.433 The following basic analysis of a pendent
party case in the context of federal question jurisdiction is therefore
suggested.
The threshold question is whether the court has constitutional power
431. See 427 U.S. at 16-18.
432. See notes 221-307 supra and accompanying text.
433. See notes 271-307 supra and accompanying text.
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over the pendent party. The Aldinger Court did not rule specifically on
the issue of what is needed for such power, although it hinted that the
Gibbs common nucleus of operative fact test might not be entirely appropriate as a basis for joining pendent parties. 4 34 In its later decision in
Owen, however, the Court apparently assumed that the Gibbs requirement for constitutional power was the test that must be met before the
matter of statutory power may be considered.435 The Gibbs test, however, apparently was modified in Owen to the extent that the relationship
between the claims asserted against a pendent party must involve not
just "factual similarity but logical dependence"4 36 upon the federal
claims. This modification nevertheless seems to have been largely ignored by the lower courts, which generally have continued to use the
common nucleus of operative fact test as they would in a pendent jurisdiction case.
Second, the court must find that Congress has not in some manner
negated the exercise of jurisdiction over nonfederal parties. In Aldinger,
for example, since counties had been sheltered from liability by not being
considered "persons" under section 1983, the Court found that Congress
by implication had negated the joinder of a county as a pendent
party. 437 This analysis may present difficulties, because statutes conferring federal jurisdiction over a particular type of action often are silent
with respect to the joinder of nonfederal parties. Some courts have attempted to find in the pertinent statutes some express or implied approval of pendent party jurisdiction. Aldinger, however, does not require
such approval; it requires only a lack of disapproval. 438 If a statute is
silent and nothing in its legislative history or judicial interpretations indicates that Congress would have found pendent party jurisdiction objectionable in connection with the statute, then under Ald'nger the federal
court has statutory power. 439 Therefore, use of the discretionary factors
to justify a finding of statutory power is not only confusing but
unnecessary.
The problem with using a discretionary factor such as judicial economy as a basis for statutory power is illustrated by Pearce v. United
States.44 0 In that case the court held that an intention to grant statutory
power over pendent parties could be inferred from the Federal Tort
Claims Act, because that statute, which provides that all claims against
the United States should be resolved at the same time, favors the eco434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

See 427 U.S. at 14.
See 437 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 376.
427 U.S. at 17.
See id at 18.
See id; notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text.
450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1978).
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nomical use of judicial energy.441 The difficulty with the court's analysis
is that the truly discretionary aspect of pendent party jurisdiction is virtually lost: if judicial economy is significant enough to result in a finding
of statutory power, it probably will be significant enough as a discretionary factor that a court, following the Gibbs analysis, would almost invariably choose to exercise its power. A court's discretion thus actually may
be weakened by the misapplication of discretionary factors to the statutory jurisdictional power analysis.442
Not until both constitutional power and lack of statutory disapproval
are established does the court have the discretion to decide whether jurisdiction should be exercised. It is apparent that the Gibbs factors are
properly used as the basis of judicial discretion in the context of pendent
party jurisdiction, and the Aldinger Court has provided the factor of exclusive federal jurisdiction as an additional consideration.443 This factor
should not be mistaken for a means to justify a finding of statutory
power. First, the language of Aldinger makes it apparent that this factor
was intended to be a discretionary consideration. 444 Second, no such justification seems to be necessary when the statute does not in some manner negate the use of pendent party jurisdiction.
Aldinger might not be as restrictive as it appears. The only element
that distinguishes it from Gibbs is the requirement of statutory as well as
constitutional power. 44 5 Only in those few cases in which some inference
of congressional disapproval of the joinder of pendent parties can be
raised might there actually be a greater restriction upon a court's ability
to hear all matters connected with a case.
Pendent party cases arising under the courts' diversity jurisdiction and
those involving the aggregation of claims to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement present different problems. 446 The basic analysis to be
applied is the same as that applied in cases arising under federal question
jurisdiction, but the result, under Owen, may be that pendent party jurisdiction may rarely be appropriate in such cases. Because section 1332
always has been interpreted as requiring complete diversity, 44 7 and recent decisions indicate that claims may not be aggregated, 44 8 the analysis
generally will end with a finding that the court has no statutory power to
join a nondiverse pendent party or one whose claim does not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement. Discretion as it is
applied in federal question cases thus will be largely irrelevant in diver441. See id at 619.
442. See notes 268-70 supra and accompanying text.
443. See 427 U.S. at 18.
444. See id
445. See id. at 15.
446. See notes 308-411 supra and accompanying text.
447. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 24, at 95.
448. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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sity or aggregation cases. 44 9 Although the Owen Court seemed to consider significant that it was the plaintiff who chose the federal forum and
who therefore should have been prepared to accept its limitations,450 this
issue apparently was not to be a discretionary consideration-in other
words, even if the party seeking to join a nondiverse party had been
brought into federal court involuntarily the result probably would have
been the same. The Owen Court stated specifically that discretionary
considerations would be insufficient to overcome the complete diversity
5
requirement.4 1
While Owen clearly precludes the use of pendent party jurisdiction as a
method of circumventing the complete diversity requirement, it should
not be read as placing additional limitations upon the joinder provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Owen itself presented highly
unusual facts, and perhaps should be limited only to those situations in
which a plaintiff attempts to sue directly a nondiverse third party who
has been impleaded by the defendant. Since the Court indicated that it
did 'not intend to limit the use of ancillary jurisdiction under the Federal
Rules, 452 to apply Owen much beyond its facts would be to extend that

decision too far. It is clear that Owen does not prohibit the use of ancillary jurisdiction in connection with compulsory counterclaims, crossclaims, impleader, or intervention,453 as long as no attempt is made to
bring a direct action against a nondiverse party not otherwise subject to
federal jurisdiction. Therefore, in a diversity case in which pendent jurisdiction appears to be an issue, it is always necessary to establish whether
the rule of complete diversity will be avoided by any means not traditionally permitted under the theory of ancillary jurisdiction.
The same general analysis should be applied in cases involving the
aggregation of claims. Although Zahn addressed the aggregation question only with respect to class actions, courts in later decisions, using the
reasoning of Aldinger and Owen, have extended the Zahn rule beyond the
class action situation.454 Attempts by litigants to draw analogies between aggregation and ancillary jurisdiction under the Federal Rules apparently have been unpersuasive, and the lower courts seem to be
following unquestioningly the Supreme Court's "dogmatic pronouncement" 455 that multiple plaintiffs with separate claims may not aggregate
them to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.456 Zahn is
broader than Owen: Zahn apparently places an unequivocal ban on the
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

See notes 308-09 supra and accompanying text.
See 437 U.S. at 376.
Id. at 377.
See id at 375.
See id at 375 & n.18.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 36, at 142.
Id. § 36, at 141.
See id § 36, at 141-42.
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aggregation of separate and distinct claims, while Owen seems to prevent
the evasion of the complete diversity requirement only by a plaintiff who
attempts to sue directly an impleaded nondiverse third party. Ancillary
jurisdiction under the Federal Rules remains more or less intact, even
though its use might also result in the joinder of a nondiverse party.
Because of the Supreme Court's strict interpretations of the complete
diversity and amount in controversy requirements, attempts to join additional parties who do not meet these requirements are very likely to be
unsuccessful. Appeals to a court's discretion to hear a pendent party
claim would be ineffective: discretion is irrelevant because of the Court's
finding that under section 1332 the federal courts have no power to hear
pendent party claims. In diversity cases in which a pendent party is
sought to be joined, care therefore must be taken to distinguish the situation from Owen; joinder will be allowed only under traditional ancillary
jurisdiction. Because at least a few courts seem to have had difficulty
distinguishing the Owen situation from ordinary ancillary jurisdiction issues, the procedural differences and the uniqueness of Owen's facts must
be emphasized. When aggregation is sought, however, there appears to
be no such means of avoiding Zahn; a finding of statutory power over the
party whose claims would be aggregated is probably impossible under
current interpretations of that case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction initially demonstrated the increasing willingness of the federal courts to hear nonfederal
matters that arose in conjunction with claims over which the courts had
been granted jurisdiction. Although pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
are still liberally applied, the Supreme Court recently seems to have retreated from the more expansive approach to federal jurisdiction by imposing certain restrictions upon the use of pendent party jurisdiction.
The extent of these restrictions, however, has not yet been fully
explained.
The matter of jurisdiction over nonfederal claims and parties, since
these limitations were imposed, involves a number of complex issues.
Among these issues is the distinction between the federal courts' power to
hear such claims and their discretion over whether to exercise that
power. This distinction can be significant, yet it is often either ignored or
misunderstood. This Note has examined the power-discretion question
and its treatment by the lower federal courts since the Owen and Aldinger
decisions, and has suggested general analyses of pendent and pendent
party jurisdiction cases in the context of the decided cases.
It is suggested that any analysis begin with the recognition that the
issue of discretion, although seldom addressed or explained, may be just
as significant as the more frequently discussed question of jurisdictional
power. Unfortunately, courts often fail to explain the reasons for their
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decisions to accept or to decline to hear a nonfederal claim; others might
apply discretionary considerations, probably incorrectly, to the jurisdictional power analysis. Either approach tends to compound the uncertainty already present in a difficult and confusing area of the law of
federal jurisdiction. This Note accordingly has recommended a careful
examination in all cases of the discretionary considerations that should
be applied, and the relative weight to be given to each. Such an analysis
may be helpful both in understanding the theory and in advocating a
position in a particular case. When the question of pendent party jurisdiction appears in a diversity case, on the other hand, the court seldom
has much discretion, but the analysis need not end there. Ancillary jurisdiction, although not a discretionary matter, is nevertheless susceptible of
a liberal interpretation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and,
despite Owen, often permits the joinder of nonfederal parties.
The state of the law is still unsettled. The Supreme Court has yet to
define the limits of pendent party jurisdiction in federal question cases,
while the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, if accomplished, will ultimately result in the elimination of the problem raised and not satisfactorily resolved in Owen. Until some standards are established, no real
consistency is likely. The type of analysis suggested in this Note, however, might be useful as an aid to the establishment of some general
guidelines.
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